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MENTAL HEALTH COURTS: NO LONGER EXPERIMENTAL
Gregory L. Acquaviva∗
Mental health courts (MHCs) are problem-solving courts that,
via a separate docket, divert mentally ill offenders away from jail and
1
into long-term community mental health treatment. By combining a
“problem-solving orientation,” the use of therapeutic jurisprudence,
2
and a redefinition of adversarialism, MHCs seek to reduce recidi3
vism. Though in existence for less than a decade, MHCs are not experimental courts. Rather, MHCs are successful, permanent compo4
nents of the criminal justice system, possessing documented results,
5
which have led to their blossoming in jurisdictions nationwide.
Despite initial success, planners and policymakers refuse to acknowledge the permanent place MHCs should hold in the judicial
6
landscape. Instead, planners nationwide establish MHCs as “pilot,”
or temporary, programs, whose future existence is contingent on innumerable societal, fiscal, and political factors. However, the popular
pilot model of MHC creation is dangerous. Often funded solely or
7
predominantly with grant money, the pilot model establishes courts
without the requisite foresight to maintain, protect, and ensure a stable existence. MHCs established as pilot programs often face “growing pains” at the conclusion of their initial charter, as the MHCs future becomes uncertain, often due to budgetary constraints.
8
Recently, these growing pains have been experienced in California,
∗
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1
See infra notes 111–35 and accompanying text.
2
See infra notes 119–30 and accompanying text.
3
See infra notes 99–110 and accompanying text.
4
See infra notes 146–69 and accompanying text.
5
See infra notes 136–45 and accompanying text.
6
See infra notes 169–74 and accompanying text.
7
See infra notes 176–85 and accompanying text.
8
See NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR MENTAL ILLNESS, SURVEY OF MENTAL HEALTH
COURTS (February 2005) [hereinafter SURVEY OF MENTAL HEALTH COURTS FEBRUARY
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Florida, Nevada, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah, and
15
Washington, where MHC advocates scrambled to maintain current
or find additional funding sources.
Rather than continue the implementation of the pilot model of
MHC establishment, planners must recognize MHC permanence,
think prospectively, and take action to implement strategies to provide resources for the indefinite support of MHCs. By providing for
long-term support, an operative infrastructure, and continued maintenance, planners will prevent and mitigate the growing pains experienced throughout the nation, while simultaneously respecting
and legitimizing MHC goals and missions.
Part I of this Article explores the emergence of MHCs in American jurisprudence. MHCs were the product of numerous factors including high recidivism rates among mentally ill offenders, pervasive
institutional problems (such as jail overcrowding, an influx of mentally ill offenders to jails and prisons, and an inability of correctional

2005], (on file with author). The Superior Court of California, County of Placer reported that the “[s]cope of future operations [is] to be determined.” Id. This language is strikingly similar to language used by the Superior Court of California in
Santa Barbara County in the July 2004 report, indicating that due to declining federal grant money the future funding and scope of the MHC was uncertain. See
NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR MENTAL ILLNESS, SURVEY OF MENTAL HEALTH COURTS (July
2004) [hereinafter SURVEY OF MENTAL HEALTH COURTS JULY 2004], (on file with author). Within a year, the Santa Barbara MHC was removed from the survey. SURVEY
OF MENTAL HEALTH COURTS FEBRUARY 2005, supra.
9
See Chuck Nowlen, Do We Need a Mental Health Court?, CAPITAL TIMES (Madison,
Wis.), July 5, 2003, at 1A (noting the MHC in Fort Lauderdale has “been eyed lately
as [a] potential line item budget cut[]”).
10
See id. Nevada state legislator Sheila Leslie noted the state’s MHCs are feeling
budget-cutting pressures. Id.; see also Susan Voyles, Special Courts Face Cash Cuts, RENO
GAZETTE-J., Dec. 29, 2002, at 1A. Judge Peter Breen said MHCs need permanent financing sources rather than living hand-to-mouth on grants susceptible to state and
county budget cuts. Id.
11
See Sarah Lemon, ‘Mental Health Court’ Concept Considered a Potential Solution,
MAIL TRIBUNE (Medford, Or.), Sept. 7, 2003, http://www.mailtribune.com/arch
ive/2003/0907/local/stories/02local.htm. According to Circuit Court administrator
Jim Adams, if Oregon does not pass a tax surcharge, then the Jackson County MHC
cannot maintain existing programs. Id.
12
See Nowlen, supra note 9 (noting the MHC in Pittsburgh has been targeted as a
budget cut).
13
See Silvia Castaneda, Budget Cuts May End Mental Health Court for Metro, (News 2
WKRN television broadcast June 21, 2004). The Davidson County MHC’s grant expired. Id. Combined with a mayoral budget cut, the program is in jeopardy. Id.
14
Elizabeth Neff, Mental Health Courts in Peril; Funding Loss Threatens Program for
Nonviolent Offenders, SALT LAKE TRIB., Aug. 17, 2004, at C1.
15
See Nowlen, supra note 9 (noting the MHC in Seattle has been eyed as a budget
cut).
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institutions to accommodate and treat the mentally ill), “McJus17
18
tice,” and judicial dissatisfaction. These systematic failures sparked
19
MHCs’ rapid spread and evolution over the past nine years. But, in
just a brief time, MHCs encountered significant preliminary success
20
in reducing recidivism and have become a fixture in the American
21
22
legal landscape, as now 113 MHCs exist in thirty-five states. Despite
their prominence, MHCs, as discussed in Part II, are suffering from
growing pains, most notably budget insufficiencies created by short23
sighted policymakers establishing MHCs as pilot programs. Part III
offers a solution for the growing pains afflicting MHCs established as
experimental: abandonment of the pilot model. Rather than establish MHCs as pilot programs, planners and policymakers should implement strategies providing the resources, funding, and infrastructure necessary to maintain MHCs indefinitely. MHC advocates must
think and act prospectively. By providing for mechanisms to increase
24
25
26
community support, diversify funding, maintain personnel, and
27
create adequate infrastructure, court planners will create stable, en28
during, community-based MHCs.

16

See infra notes 32–86 and accompanying text.
Greg Berman, ed., What is a Traditional Judge Anyway? Problem Solving in the State
Courts, JUDICATURE, Sept.-Oct. 2000, at 78, 80 (comments of Judge Kathleen Blatz).
18
See infra notes 87–98 and accompanying text.
19
See infra notes 99–135 and accompanying text.
20
See infra notes 146–69 and accompanying text.
21
See infra notes 136–45 and accompanying text.
22
See NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR MENTAL ILLNESS, SURVEY OF MENTAL HEALTH
COURTS (December 2005) [hereinafter SURVEY OF MENTAL HEALTH COURTS DECEMBER
2005], available at http://www.mentalhealthcourtsurvey.com/pdfs/Mental_Health_
Courts.pdf (updated periodically).
23
See infra notes 171–89 and accompanying text.
24
See infra notes 190–237 and accompanying text.
25
See infra notes 238–64 and accompanying text.
26
See infra notes 265–93 and accompanying text.
27
See infra notes 294–310 and accompanying text.
28
While calling upon planners and policymakers to abandon the pilot model of
MHC creation in favor of establishing permanent MHCs, I do not, however, lose
sight of the fact that MHC pilot programs are rational and may be more politically
palatable than the alternative this Comment proposes. For example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that it is “rational” for a state legislature to limit a
program’s “initial reach to a small group . . . before prescribing the same procedures
more generally throughout the state. . . . [T]here is nothing improper about this
method of attacking social problems of statewide dimension, as the Legislature is
free, for reasons of necessity or otherwise, to address such issues incrementally.”
Harrisburg Sch. Dist. v. Zogby, 828 A.2d 1079, 1090–91 (Pa. 2003). Thus, while the
pilot model can be an attractive option to legislators and planners, I maintain that
such a short-sited model is not the best option.
17
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THE EMERGENCE OF MENTAL HEALTH COURTS
IN THE UNITED STATES

A. The Need for Mental Health Courts
29

MHCs are a product of a “desperation” confronting the criminal justice system, a desperation consisting of numerous factors such
as a “revolving door” epidemic and the judicial dissatisfaction associ30
ated with “McJustice.”
These systematic failures continue today.
Specifically, recidivism is a significant problem for mentally ill offenders who often make repeated visits to correctional institutions.
Further escalating the recidivism problem is the inability of the detention facilities to adequately deal with mentally ill offenders, who
find themselves subject to detrimental forces within the confines of
overcrowded, ill-equipped jails and prisons. Additionally, these problems, combined with the rising caseloads and lack of tools available to
judges, created a heightened sense of judicial dissatisfaction with traditional handling of mentally ill offenders. These concerns highlight
31
the need for continued MHC establishment and expansion.
i.

The Revolving Door and Other Institutional Concerns

The “revolving door” refers to the carousel mentally ill individuals ride: a minor, non-violent crime, followed by a court appearance,
followed by incarceration, followed by release, followed by another
minor, non-violent crime. Thus, the mentally ill offender’s low-level
32
crimes are “recycling problems.” Bruce J. Winick, professor of law at
the University of Miami School of Law, posits that these recycling
problems have not been adequately addressed by traditional interventions. “The traditional judicial model addressed symptoms, but not
the underlying problem. The result was that the problem reemerged,

29

Jenni Bergal, Justice That Works; Mentally Ill Defendants Avoid the Revolving Door of
Jail, Get Their Lives Back on Track Through Mental Health Court’s Assistance, SUNSENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), Nov. 24, 2002, at 1A.
30
See Berman, supra note 17, at 80 (comments of Judge Kathleen Blatz); see also
infra notes 87–98 and accompanying text.
31
Lisa Shoaf, A Case Study of the Akron Mental Health Court, 32 CAP. U.L. REV. 975,
977 (2003) (“There was no real impetus for implementing the [Akron MHC], other
than the growing awareness that severely mentally ill individuals were increasingly
finding themselves caught in a ‘revolving door’ in and out of the criminal justice system and were never able to receive the assistance they required.”).
32
Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Problem Solving Courts, 30
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1055, 1060 (2003).
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constantly necessitating repeated judicial intervention.”
Statistics
34
prove the revolving door’s reality, as 48% of mentally ill federal
prisoners have three or more prior probations, incarcerations, or ar35
rests, compared to just 28% of non-mentally ill prisoners.
The
crime/court/jail/release cycle increases the “criminalization” of the
mentally ill, whereby these offenders are continually arrested and
prosecuted for minor offenses without receiving adequate mental
36
health treatment. Though the revolving door is a problem unto itself, its broad effects generate inefficient utilization of court resources, jail overcrowding, and ineffective mental health treatment.
37
For example, the sheer volume of mentally ill individuals on dockets
causes courts to devote inordinate resources to such offenders, diverting attention away from more serious, dangerous, and violent crimi38
nals.

33

Id.
Pub. L. No. 106-515, § 2, 114 Stat. 2399, 2399 (2000) (finding, in accordance
with a Bureau of Justice Statistics report, that three-quarters of mentally ill inmates
have been sentenced to prison, jail, or probation at least once prior to their current
incarceration).
35
DEREK DENCKLA & GREG BERMAN, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, RETHINKING THE
REVOLVING DOOR: A LOOK AT MENTAL ILLNESS IN THE COURTS 4 (2001), available at
http://www.courtinnovation.org/_uploads/documents/rethinkingtherevolvingdoor.
pdf (citing PAULA M. DITTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MENTAL HEALTH AND TREATMENT
OF INMATES AND PROBATIONERS 5 (Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report, July
1999), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/mhtip.pdf); Bentson H.
McFarland et al., Chronic Mental Illness and the Criminal Justice System, 40 HOSP. & CMTY.
PSYCHIATRY 718 (1989) (noting that family members of the mentally ill report that
such individuals average more than three arrests)). A total of 49% of federal prisoners with mental illness have at least three previous probations, incarcerations, or arrests. DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra, at 4. These national numbers are corroborated by
local statistics. For example, in Lucas County, Ohio, over 72% of people with mental
illness are re-arrested within three years of their jail release. Lois A. Ventura et al.,
Case Management and Recidivism of Mentally Ill Persons Released From Jail, 49 PSYCHIATRIC
SERVICES 1330, 1333 (1998).
36
See Christin E. Keele, Note, Criminalization of the Mentally Ill: The Challenging Role
of the Defense Attorney in the Mental Health Court System, 71 UMKC L. REV. 193, 194–95
(2002) (noting most cases criminalizing mental illness involve minor crimes, where
the acts are manifestations of their illness and corresponding lack of treatment) (citing H. Richard Lamb, M.D. & Linda E. Weinberger, Ph.D., Persons with Severe Mental
Illness in Jails and Prisons: A Review, 49 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 483, 484 (1998)); see also
Marc F. Abramson, The Criminalization of Mentally Disordered Behavior: Possible Side-Effect
of a New Mental Health Law, 23 HOSP. & CMTY. PSYCHIATRY 101 (1972).
37
See generally DITTON, supra note 35 (discussing statistics regarding incarcerated
mentally ill individuals). Between 600,000 and 700,000 mentally ill individuals are
annually booked in jail.
38
See JUDGE DAVID L. BAZELON, CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH L., CRIMINALIZATION
OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS: THE ROLE OF MENTAL HEALTH COURTS IN SYSTEM
REFORM 2 (Jan. 2003).
34
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Such negative effects travel with mentally ill offenders from
39
overburdened courts to overcrowded jails. Since 1970, the national
40
jail and prison population increased fivefold, to 1.6 million people.
The “critically overcrowded” incarceration system has many causes,
41
including deinstitutionalization, the War on Drugs, and increased
42
“quality of life” offense enforcement. In a thirty-year span, these factors quadrupled the ratio of incarcerated individuals in state and fed43
eral prisons per 100,000 in the community. The United States has
the world’s third-highest incarceration rate, trailing only Russia and
44
Rwanda.
Further escalating the overcrowding quagmire is an influx of
45
mentally ill offenders, a prevalence that “threatens to overwhelm the

39

GREG BERMAN & JOHN FEINBLATT, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, PROBLEM
SOLVING COURTS: A BRIEF PRIMER 5 (2001) [hereinafter BERMAN & FEINBLATT, PROBLEM
SOLVING], available at http://www.courtinnovation.org/pdf/prob_solv_courts.pdf
(recognizing the surging incarcerated population).
40
DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 35, at 3 (citing UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1998 (Bureau of Justice Statistics
Internet Report, 1999)). Compare with Mark R. Munetz , M.D. & Jennifer L.S. Teller,
Ph.D., The Challenges of Cross-Disciplinary Collaborations: Bridging the Mental Health and
Criminal Justice Systems, 32 CAP. U.L. REV. 935, 937–38 (2003) (noting that in 2002 the
population of American state and federal prisons was 1,440,655, with another
665,475 individuals in local jails. “As of June 30, 2002, the nation’s prison and jail
population exceeded two million people for the first time in history.”).
41
See infra notes 79–86 and accompanying text.
42
See, e.g., J.S. GOLDKAMP & C. IRONS-GUYNN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EMERGING
JUDICIAL STRATEGIES FOR THE MENTALLY ILL IN THE CRIMINAL CASELOAD: MENTAL
HEALTH COURTS IN FORT LAUDERDALE, SEATTLE, SAN BERNARDINO, AND ANCHORAGE
(Bureau of Justice Assistance, April 2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/html/
bja/mentalhealth/contents.html; DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 35, at 2.
43
Steven Lamberti, M.D., New Approaches to Preventing Incarceration of Severely Mentally Ill Adults, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES, June 1, 2004, at 33 (“The number of individuals
incarcerated in state and federal prisons per 100,000 in the community quadrupled
from 100 to over 400 between 1965 and 1996. Similar trends have been noted in jails
across the nation . . . [leading to] a combined rate of approximately 700 per 100,000
residing in jails and prisons.”); see also Munetz & Teller, supra note 40, at 938 (recognizing that the “6.6 million Americans incarcerated, on probation, or parole in 2001”
represented a 258% increase from 1980).
44
Lamberti, supra note 43, at 33; compare with Munetz & Teller, supra note 40, at
937 (noting that America’s incarceration rate of 701 per 100,000 individuals ranks
the United States ahead of Russia as the world leader in incarcerating its citizens).
45
See Munetz & Teller, supra note 40, at 940. According to Stephan Haimowitz,
“although mental illness does not actually lead to legal problems, and some crimes
committed by people with mental disabilities are not a result of their disability, many
people do enter and remain in the criminal justice system as a result of mental disorders.” Id. (quoting Stephan Haimowitz, Can Mental Health Courts End the Criminalization of Persons with Mental Illness?, 53 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1226, 1228 (2002).
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46

criminal justice system.” Approximately 16% of inmates nationwide
47
are mentally ill, while 30%–75% of detained juveniles have mental
48
49
problems. These “shockingly high” percentages reflect a 154% increase in the proportion of mentally ill offenders in jail from 1980 to
50
1992. The effect of mentally ill offenders on the criminal justice sys51
tem is overwhelming. Approximately 250,000 severely mentally ill
52
Americans are incarcerated, while as many as 40% of the nation’s
53
This influx
mentally ill encounter the criminal justice system.
forced the criminal justice system to replace the mental health system
54
as the nation’s primary provider of mental health treatment. Thus,
46

COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE/MENTAL HEALTH
CONSENSUS PROJECT 6 (2002) [hereinafter CONSENSUS PROJECT], available at http://
www.consensusproject.org.
47
DITTON, supra note 35, at 1; see also DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 35, at 3.
Specifically, 7% of jail inmates and 14% of prison inmates suffer from schizophrenia,
bipolar disorder, or major depression. LeRoy L. Kondo, Advocacy of the Establishment
of Mental Health Specialty Courts in the Provision of Therapeutic Justice for Mentally Ill Offenders, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 255, 257 (2001).
48
See also Coalition for Juvenile Justice: What’s New, http://www.juvjustice.org/
resources/fs002.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2006)) (estimating that one half to threequarters of juveniles in the criminal justice system have diagnosable mental health
problems). Compare Symposium, The Birth of a Problem Solving Court, 29 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1758, 1777 (2002) [hereinafter The Birth of a Problem Solving Court] (comments of Lisa Schreibersdorf, Brooklyn Defender Services) (estimating the percentage of mentally ill juveniles at 30%) with Agata DiGiovanni, The Los Angeles County Juvenile Mental Health Court: An Innovative Approach to Crime, Violence, and Delinquency
Among Our Youth, 23 J. JUV. L. 1, 2 (2002/2003) (estimating the percentage of mentally ill juveniles at 50%–75%).
49
BAZELON, supra note 38, at 4.
50
Amy Watson et al., Mental Health Courts and the Complex Issue of Mentally Ill Offenders, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 477, (April 2001), available at http://ps.psychiatry
online.org/cgi/reprint/52/4/477.
51
See Paul F. Stavis, Why Prisons are Brim-Full of the Mentally Ill: Is Their Incarceration
a Solution or a Sign of Failure?, 11 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 157, 157–58, 202 (2000)
(showing the direct relationship between deinstitutionalization and jail overcrowding).
52
Compare Robert Bernstein & Tammy Seltzer, Criminalization of People with Mental
Illnesses: The Role of Mental Health Courts in System Reform, 7 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 143,
145 (2003) (projecting the incarcerated population of mentally ill Americans at
250,000), with Kondo, supra note 47, at 256 (projecting the population at 210,000),
with THE NATIONAL ALLIANCE OF THE MENTALLY ILL, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF PEOPLE
WITH MENTAL ILLNESS—NAMI’S POSITION (projecting the population at 283,000).
53
Pub. L. No. 106-515, § 2, 114 Stat. 2399, 2399 (2000) (finding, in accordance
with the National Alliance of Mentally Ill, that 25%–40% of America’s mentally ill
contact the criminal justice system); see also Kondo supra note 47, at 272.
54
John Petrila et al., Preliminary Observations from an Evaluation of the Broward
County Mental Health Court, 37 CT. REV. 14, 14 (2002) (citing Fox Butterfield, Asylums
Behind Bars: A Special Report; Prisons Replace Hospitals for the Nation’s Mentally Ill, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 5, 1998, at A1, A18; E. Fuller Torrey, Jails and Prisons—America’s New Mental Hospitals, 85 AMER. J. PUB. HEALTH 1611 (1995)). Additionally, there are three
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in 1992, the Los Angeles County jail became the nation’s largest men55
56
tal institution, with Cook County Jail, Illinois, and Riker’s Island,
57
New York, as second and third respectively. But, no matter what sta58
tistics are referenced, the prospects of treating incarcerated mentally ill offenders are bleak, as jails are referred to as: “the black hole
59
60
of the mental health system,” “hospitals of last resort,” “surrogate
61
62
mental hospitals,” “the dumping ground for the mentally ill,” and
63
“America’s new asylums.”
Despite the staggering population of incarcerated mentally ill offenders, correctional institutions cannot effectively accommodate or
treat them. In short, jail and prison facilities are inadequate for car64
ing for the mentally ill.
Correctional institutions were never intended to be mental health hospitals, thus they lack proper resources,
times as many people with severe mental illness in prison as there are in mental hospitals. Jennifer S. Bard, Re-arranging Deck Chairs on the Titanic: Why the Incarceration of
Individuals with Serious Mental Illness Violates Public Health, Ethical, and Constitutional
Principles and Therefore Cannot be Made Right by Piecemeal Changes to the Insanity Defense, 5
HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 17 (2005).
55
Watson et al., supra note 50, at 477–78 (citing Michael Jonathan Grinfeld, Report Focuses on Jailed Mentally Ill, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES, July 1993, at 1 (noting the Los
Angeles County jail houses 3300 inmates requiring daily mental health services)); see
also Munetz & Teller, supra note 40, at 939.
56
On any day, the Cook County Jail holds approximately 1000 inmates in need of
treatment for mental illness. Jaime Levy Pessin, Stopping the Revolving Door: New Court
Seeks New Ways to Provide Justice to the Mentally Ill, CHIC. LAW., Mar. 2005, at 8.
57
Keele, supra note 36, at 196 (citing Mark J. Heyrman, Mental Illness in Prisons
and Jails, 7 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 113, 113 (2000)).
58
See Michael A. Scarcella, Charlotte County Working on Mental Health Court,
SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE, Dec. 24, 2004, at BC1 (discussing the changing face of
mental health treatment on a smaller scale. “‘We’re becoming the mental health
hospitals for the state,’ [John] Davenport [Charlotte County Sheriff-elect] said . . . .
He noted that the February 2002 closure of the state psychiatric hospital in DeSoto
County, G. Pierce Wood, put caring for the mentally ill in the hands of the community.”).
59
Keele, supra note 36, at 196 (citing David Sapinsky, Troubling Statistics, Persistent
Problems (ABC News television broadcast Dec. 11, 2000) (referring to comments of
Laurie Flynn, executive director of NAMI).
60
DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 35, at 3.
61
Kondo, supra note 47, at 258.
62
Mike O’Neal, Half of County’s Inmates Medicated for Mental Illness, CHATTANOOGA
TIMES FREE PRESS, June 19, 2005, at B3 (quoting Cameka Sanderfur, criminal justice
mental health liaison for Hamilton County, Tennessee).
63
Kondo, supra note 47, at 307 (citing House Republicans Angling to Fill Committee’s
Vacancy, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Columbus, Ohio), July 25, 1999, at 7A) [hereinafter
House Republicans] (quoting Representative Ted Strickland).
64
Hamilton County, Tennessee is a prime example of this dilemma. O’Neal, supra note 62. There, 300 of the county’s nearly 600 inmates take daily psychotropic
drugs for mental disorder treatment. Id. However, the doctor is only available one
day a week and sometimes can only evaluate four patients per day. Id.
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facilities, and professionals to address mental illness. Shockingly,
66
one-fifth of jails have absolutely no access to mental health services.
67
The sponsor of federal legislation promoting MHC creation, Senator Mike DeWine, argued that “correctional facilities simply do not
have the means, or the expertise, to properly treat mentally ill in68
mates.”
Thus, due to the criminal justice system’s inadequacies,
83% of mentally ill state prisoners and 89% of mentally ill jail inmates
69
do not receive treatment. And the minority who do receive treatment must wait on long lines, without participation incentives, and be
70
subjected to stigmatization.
This inability to provide adequate mental health treatment
gravely affects a sensitive population. While incarceration is unpleasant, inadequate mental health care escalates the mentally ill’s stress71
ful ordeal, causing crises and a plethora of avoidable problems.
These poorly-cared for individuals are vulnerable to physical abuse by
other inmates, are exposed to deadly diseases, and often commit sui72
cide. Such vulnerabilities and insufficient treatment cause deterio73
ration in jail. Ultimately, “[o]nce someone with a mental disorder
enters the criminal justice system, it is unlikely that their mental

65

E.g., DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 35, at 3; GOLDKAMP & IRONS-GUYNN, supra
note 42, at 60; Kondo, supra note 47, at 260; Debra Baker, A One-of-a-Kind Court May
Offer the Best Hope for Steering Nonviolent Mentally Ill Defendants into Care Instead of Jail,
84 A.B.A. J. 20 (1998) (noting the vast majority of jails provide inadequate, if any,
training to corrections officer in treating mental illness); compare with Nancy Wolff,
Interactions Between Mental Health and Law Enforcement Systems: Problems and Prospects for
Cooperation, 23 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 133, 144 (1998) (stating that fewer than
20% of jails offer any mental health services to inmates).
66
Baker, supra note 65, at 20.
67
See infra notes 136–40 and accompanying text.
68
Kondo, supra note 47, at 259 (citing Mike DeWine, Treatment for Mentally Ill Inmates, CONGRESSIONAL PRESS RELEASES (FEDERAL DOCUMENT CLEARING HOUSE) Oct. 20,
1999, at 1) [hereinafter, DeWine, CONGRESSIONAL PRESS RELEASE].
69
DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 35, at 3 (citing DITTON, supra note 35).
70
See id.
71
GOLDKAMP & IRONS-GUYNN, supra note 42.
72
Baker, supra note 65, at 20.
73
See DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 35, at 3–4; Kondo, supra note 47, at 306 (citing House Republicans, supra note 63) (discussing the opinion of Representative Ted
Strickland); see also Anna B. Brutzman, Judges Push Mental-Health Court, GREENVILLE
NEWS (S.C.), Feb. 8, 2005, at 15B (noting comments of Dave Almeida, executive director of the South Carolina chapter of the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill);
Sheila Burke, Public, Offenders Win in This Deal, TENNESSEAN, Dec. 10, 2004, at 1B. (“‘It
[jail] was hell,’ [Hollis] Bowman-Lovejoy said. The constant noise from the other
inmates exacerbated her mental illness. ‘I couldn’t sleep for three or four days,’ she
said.”).
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74

health will improve.” Yet, an irony exists, in that “mental health
treatment often is a necessary component of effective rehabilitation
75
and recidivism prevention programs.”
While jail overcrowding and the corresponding inability to handle mentally ill offenders are at a crisis level, such plagues are not isolated. Rather, today’s problems are the result of yesterday’s social
76
changes, which created holes in society’s safety net. The two major
holes are the deinstitutionalization of the nation’s mental asylums
and failing community treatment. These holes promoted the shunting of the mentally ill into the criminal justice system at “an alarming
77
rate,” in hopes that ill offenders would receive minimal services un78
available in the community.
Deinstitutionalization is the systematic shift of the mentally ill
from sizeable, residential, government-run asylums to fragmented,
79
community-based treatment. This “mass exodus” of the mentally ill
away from psychiatric facilities and into the community has been
80
“striking.”
For example, 763,391 people, or 92%, of those who
would have resided in public psychiatric hospitals in the 1950s were

74

James R. Walker, Comment, Getting the Mentally Ill Misdemeanant Out of Jail, 6
SCHOLAR 371, 388 (2004) (citing Baker, supra note 65, at 21).
75
Richard E. Redding, Justice, Ethics, and Interdisciplinary Teaching and Practice: Why
it is Essential to Teach About Mental Health Issues in Criminal Law (And a Primer on How to
Do it), 14 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 407, 410 (2004); see also Stacey M. Faraci, Slip Slidin’
Away? Will our Nation’s Mental Health Court Experiment Diminish the Rights of the Mentally
Ill?, 22 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 811, 848 (2004).
76
Bernstein & Seltzer, supra note 52, at 143 (citing CONSENSUS PROJECT, supra
note 46).
77
Id.
78
See Redding, supra note 75, at 409.
79
See DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 35, at 2 (defining deinstitutionalization as “a
systematic shift in resources for treating people with mental illness—from large, residential, state-run psychiatric hospitals to community-based treatment”); see also
Walker, supra note 74, at 373 (citing Heyrman, supra note 57, at 114) (defining deinstitutionalization as “the push for more community-based treatment necessitating
discharge from state psychiatric facilities”).
80
Walker, supra note 74, at 378 (citing H. Richard Lamb, Deinstitutionalization at
the Beginning of the New Millennium, in DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION: PROMISE AND
PROBLEMS 3 (H. Richard Lamb & Linda E. Weinberger eds., 2001)).
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81

not housed there by the 1990s. Thus in 2000, only 54,836 mentally
82
ill individuals were institutionalized.
Despite the last half century’s deinstitutionalization, community
mental health treatment has not accommodated the massive patient
83
84
increase. MHCs are reactive to the mental health system’s failures:
85
failures due to lacking resources, services, and funding. Judge Mark
Chow of the King County Mental Health Court said, “If there were
sufficient services out there in the community, we wouldn’t need
86
mental health court.” Thus, the irony is clear: MHCs divert mentally
ill offenders into treatment, but if treatment were effective, such individuals would not offend.
ii.

“McJustice” and Judicial Dissatisfaction

While the revolving door faced by the mentally ill strained the
criminal justice system’s resources, judicial dissatisfaction with “traditional” handling of mentally ill offenders simultaneously increased.
This dissatisfaction prompted the expansion of problem-solving justice and MHCs. Kathleen Blatz, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of Minnesota posits:
[T]he innovation that we’re seeing now (the rise of problemsolving courts) is a result of judges processing cases like a vegeta81

Kondo, supra note 47, at 269 (citing E. Fuller Torrey, OUT OF THE SHADOWS:
CONFRONTING AMERICA’S MENTAL ILLNESS CRISIS 8–9 (1997)). Compare with DENCKLA &
BERMAN, supra note 35, at 3 (citing Terry Kupers, PRISON MADNESS: THE MENTAL
HEALTH CRISIS BEHIND BARS AND WHAT WE MUST DO ABOUT IT, 1999) (estimating that
in 1955, 560,000 mentally ill individuals were institutionalized, compared to less than
80,000 in 1999).
82
Bergal, supra note 29 (referencing the United States Department of Health
and Human Services). Deinstitutionalization has continued into the twenty-first century as well. For example, Dr. Gerald Ross, executive director of the Charlotte
Community Mental Health Services, cites the 2002 closing of G. Pierce Wood, a DeSoto County, Florida, psychiatric hospital, as a reason causing increased jailing of
mentally ill individuals. Amy Abern, Program Provides Outlet, Safety for Mentally Ill;
Through Art and Individual Attention, the DOORS Program Helps Break a Vicious Cycle,
SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB., July 29, 2005, at BC1.
83
See Pessin, supra note 56, at 8 (recognizing that community mental health treatment did not increase as the number of hospital beds decreased during deinstitutionalization).
84
See BAZELON, supra note 38, at 2 (“As communities grapple with this fallout
from unresponsive mental health and social services systems, reforms are being proposed.”).
85
Wendy N. Davis, Special Problems for Specialty Courts, 89 A.B.A. J. 32, 37 (2003)
(quoting Oscar Morgan, senior consultant for mental health policy and programs at
the National Mental Health Association: “We believe that the mental health courts
are in some ways an outgrowth of the fact that mental health services are underfunded.”).
86
Id.
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ble factory. Instead of cans of peas, you’ve got cases. You just
move ‘em, move ‘em, move ‘em. One of my colleagues on the
bench said: “You know, I feel like I work for McJustice: we sure
87
aren’t good for you, but we are fast.”

Judges are dissatisfied. Dissatisfied with their tools. Dissatisfied
with their assignments. Dissatisfied with the “revolving door” of
88
89
criminal justice. Stories of despair abound. For Judge Judy Harris
Kluger, a New York City Criminal Court Administrative Judge, it was
the sheer volume of crime. She once arraigned 200 cases in a single
90
session, too busy to look up and view the defendants before her. For
Judge Laura Ward, of the Manhattan Treatment Court, it was recognizing that the status quo was unproductive. “Sitting in arraignments,
I quickly realized that jail wasn’t the answer. You’d put them in jail
on Monday for a crack pipe, only to have them back in court on
91
Wednesday for something new.” Ultimately, judges, like Kluger and
Ward, desired a better system. Patrick McGrath, Deputy District Attorney of San Diego, sums up judicial dissatisfaction, stating:
I think it’s fair to say there’s a sense of yearning out there. If you
grab a judge, a defense attorney and prosecutor and sat them
down together and bought them a round of drinks, after a few
beers, they’ll all complain about the same thing: “I have all this
education and what do I do? I work on an assembly line. I don’t
affect case outcomes.” I think in a lot of ways problem-solving
courts are addressing all of our yearning to do more than just
92
process cases.

87

Berman, supra note 17, at 80.
See GREG BERMAN & JOHN FEINBLATT, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, JUDGES AND
PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS 21 (2002) [hereinafter BERMAN & FEINBLATT, JUDGES],
available at http://www.courtinnovation.org/pdf/judges_problem_solving_courts.
pdf.
89
For example, Judge Legrome Davis, a Philadelphia criminal court judge, sentenced, in one year, 5000 pleading felons. Berman, supra note 17, at 80. For the
next half decade, he watched those 5000 individuals repetitively offend. Id. Santa
Clara drug court’s Judge Stephen V. Manley felt the system failed individuals and
families. BERMAN & FEINBLATT, JUDGES, supra note 88, at 21–22. “When you begin
sentencing the children of those you sentenced . . . you have to ask yourself, ‘Have
you made any change?’ . . . [Y]ou begin to question why we’re doing the same thing
over and over again.” Id.
90
Berman, supra note 17, at 81 (“[M]y claim to fame was that I arraigned 200
cases in one session. That’s ridiculous. When I was arraigning cases, I’d be handed
the papers, say the sentence is going to be five days, ten days, whatever, never even
looking at the defendant.”).
91
BERMAN & FEINBLATT, JUDGES, supra note 88, at 21.
92
John Feinblatt & Derek Denckla eds., What Does it Mean to be a Good Lawyer?
Prosecutors, Defenders and Problem-Solving Courts, JUDICATURE, Jan.-Feb. 2001, at 206, 209.
88
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Judicial dissatisfaction traces back to rising caseloads. State
93
court case filings reached 91.5 million in 1998, an all-time high. In
New York City alone, the misdemeanor caseload increased by 85% in
94
the decade following 1989. This upsurge was consistent with na95
tional trends, as from 1984 to 1998 criminal filings increased 50%.
96
The caseload volume overwhelmed courts, transforming courtrooms
into “plea bargain mills” which value efficiency: maximum volume,
97
minimum time. According to Judge Judith S. Kaye, Chief Judge of
New York State, the “volume of our dockets demands efficient management. But processing more cases more quickly isn’t the whole answer. We also need to take a step back and ask ‘Is there a better way
to do this?’ In fact, across the country, some judges are starting to re98
think business as usual.”
B. The Birth of Mental Health Courts
Over the past two decades, the Sunshine State was a legal innovation laboratory. By establishing the nation’s first drug court in
1989, Dade County, Florida became the birthplace of modern prob99
lem-solving justice. Only eight years later, spurred by the success of
100
drug courts nationally, the country’s first MHC commenced in
101
Broward County.

93

Greg Berman & John Feinblatt, Problem-Solving Justice: A Quiet Revolution,
JUDICATURE, Jan.-Feb. 2003, at 182 [hereinafter Berman & Feinblatt, A Quiet Revolution].
94
BERMAN & FEINBLATT, PROBLEM SOLVING, supra note 39, at 6 (citing Greg
Rohde, Crackdown on Minor Offenses Swamps New York City Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2,
1999, at A1).
95
David B. Rottman, Does Effective Therapeutic Jurisprudence Require Specialized Courts
(and Do Specialized Courts Imply Specialist Judges)?, 37 CT. REV. 22, 25 (2000). Comparatively, the United States population grew by only 15% over the same time period. Id.
96
Cait Clarke & James Neuhard, “From Day One”: Who’s in Control as Problem Solving and Client-Centered Sentencing Take Center Stage?, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
11, 26 (2004) (citing Paul D. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeal: The
Threat to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542, 542–49
(1969)) (“[T]he number of criminal cases overwhelmed court systems.”).
97
See BERMAN & FEINBLATT, PROBLEM SOLVING, supra note 39, at 7 (citing Judge
Judith S. Kaye, Making the Case for Hands-On Courts, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 11, 1999, at 13).
98
Kaye, supra note 97, at 13.
99
E.g., AUBREY FOX & ROBERT V. WOLF, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, THE FUTURE
OF DRUG COURTS: HOW STATES ARE MAINSTREAMING THE DRUG COURT MODEL 1 (2004),
available at http://www.courtinnovation.org/pdf/future_of_drug_courts.pdf.
100
See DiGiovanni, supra note 48, at 8 (“The success of drug courts has been influential in the recent emergence of mental health courts across the nation.”).
101
GOLDKAMP & IRONS-GUYNN, supra note 42. By administrative order of Chief
Judge Dale Ross, the Broward County MHC began operation on June 6, 1997. Id.
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Despite Florida’s predilection for jurisprudential innovation, the
catalyst for the nation’s first MHC was Aaron Wynn. In the mid102
1980’s, Wynn suffered brain damage in a motorcycle accident. Despite attempts to access viable treatment in the mental health and
criminal justice systems, Wynn’s anger was uncontrollable, precipitating a 1993 incident where Wynn knocked down and killed an 85-year103
old woman outside a grocery store.
Wynn was charged with man104
105
slaughter, and the MHC movement inauspiciously began.
The next year, Broward County received a “scathing grand jury
report” concerning “severe shortfalls” in the county’s mental health
106
system.
Combined with Wynn’s high-profile crime, the report
forced Broward County to act, leading to the 1994 creation of a multi107
agency task force.
The ad hoc committee of various county stakeholders, led by Judge Mark A. Speiser, proposed the establishment of
108
a MHC. Judge Ginger Lerner-Wren, the first judge to preside over

102

See, e.g., Bergal, supra note 29.
See id.
104
See, e.g., id.
105
High-profile crime has been a common spark for MHC creation. Kondo, supra
note 47, at 302 (“At times, a newsworthy criminal event triggers immediate public
awareness for the need for specialized courts.”). For example, in King County, Washington, a retired firefighter was murdered by a man with a violent history and multiple psychiatric hospitalizations. JOHN R. NEISWENDER, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF
EVALUATION OF OUTCOMES FOR KING COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH COURT 2 (2004), available at http://www.metrokc.gov/KCDC/mhcsum32.pdf. The crime was committed
within two weeks of a jail release on a misdemeanor charge. Id. “The incident galvanized the community and became the impetus for the formation of a task force
that studied how the mentally ill defendant was treated in the criminal justice system.” Id. Charlotte County, Florida, is currently planning an MHC. Id. Officials cite
the June 2004 murder of a seven year-old girl in a motel room as the court’s catalyst.
Id. The girl’s mother, who had a lengthy history of mental illness, later confessed to
the homicide. Id. This trend may continue. See Kate Gurnett, Mental Health Court
Possible, THE TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), June 9, 2005, at B1 (noting that Albany,
New York officials are considering creating a MHC following three incidents since
1995 of mentally ill mothers murdering their children); Jeff Long, Mental Health
Court is Studied; Woodstock Slaying Might Have Been Averted, Official Says, CHI. TRIBUNE,
July 15, 2005, at 1 (noting that DuPage County, Illinois, has formed a task force to
study the creation of a MHC, prompted, in part, by an alleged murder committed by
a man suffering from bipolar disorder, who doused a woman with gasoline and set
her ablaze).
106
JUDGE GINGER LERNER-WREN, BROWARD’S MENTAL HEALTH COURT: AN
INNOVATIVE APPROACH TO THE MENTALLY DISABLED IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 2
(2000), http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/KIS_ProSol_Trends99-00_Fla
MentalPub.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2006).
107
Id.
108
See id.
103
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109

the Broward County MHC, said, “[t]he court came to be out of
110
desperation. But it has turned out to be a great vehicle.”
C. The Mental Health Court Model
111

112

MHCs are problem-solving courts that, via a separate docket,
use judicial process to divert mentally ill offenders away from jail and
113
into long-term community mental health treatment.
By avoiding
incarceration, MHCs use a multi-disciplinary approach to treat the
114
underlying, or “root,” cause of the offender’s criminal conduct:
115
mental illness.
According to Associate Judge Lawrence P. Fox, of
109

Judge Lerner-Wren was formerly the county’s public guardian, responsible for
overseeing the health and welfare of incapacitated adults, and oversaw the implementation of an agreement improving conditions within South Florida State Hospital
and surrounding community mental health systems. Petrila et al., supra note 54, at
16; see also Bergal, supra note 29.
110
Bergal, supra note 29.
111
There is no clearly articulated definition or philosophy that unites all problemsolving justice practitioners. BERMAN & FEINBLATT, PROBLEM SOLVING, supra note 39,
at 3. However, problem-solving courts are, generally, collaborative, holistic courts
that seek to resolve the root causes of conflicts via an interdisciplinary approach.
The specific issues facing problem-solving courts (drug use, domestic violence, mental health, etc.) are modern, persistent issues, resulting from social, legal, and personal problems that traditional courts are ill-equipped to handle. With an orientation toward the future and design to seek tangible outcomes, judicial authority
combines punishment and treatment to reduce recidivism, increase efficiency, and
increase public safety. See Winick, supra note 32, at 1055, 1061; see GREG BERMAN &
JOHN FEINBLATT, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, JUDGES AND PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS
4 (2002), available at http://www.courtinnovation.org/pdf/judges_problem_solving_
courts.pdf; DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 35, at 7.
112
Faraci, supra note 75, at 825.
113
See Winick, supra note 32, at 1059 (“Mental health courts seek to divert [the
mentally ill offenders] from the criminal justice system and to persuade them to voluntarily accept treatment while in the community.”) (citing GOLDKAMP & IRONSGUYNN, supra note 42; Petrila et al., supra note 54, at 14–15).
114
Teresa W. Carns et al., Therapeutic Justice in Alaska’s Courts, 19 ALASKA L. REV. 1,
5 (2002); see also Daniel J. Becker & Maura D. Corrigan, Moving Problem-Solving Courts
into the Mainstream: A Report Card from the CCJ-COSCA Problem Solving Court Committee,
39 CT. REV. 4 (2002) (“[P]roblem-solving courts generally focus on the underlying
chronic behaviors of criminal defendants”).
115
See Bruce J. Winick, Preventative Outpatient Commitment for Persons With Serious
Mental Illness: Outpatient Commitment: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis, 9 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL’Y & L. 107, 126 (2003). Mental illness, not criminality, is the root cause of
many offenses by mentally ill individuals.
However structured, the mental health court proceeds on the assumption that, for at least some defendants charged with minor, non-violent
offenses, the problem is more a product of mental illness than of
criminality, and that facilitating the offender’s access to and engagement in mental health treatment constitutes a more effective response
to the underlying problem than would criminal conviction and sentence.
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the Cook County, Illinois, MHC, “It’s innovative and appropriate for
criminal justice to recognize we have a lot of people in jail more because of their mental illness than their criminality . . . . They need
treatment more than they need to be in jail, more than they need to
116
be punished.”
In short, MHC’s focus is on therapeutic interven117
tion, not prosecution. Though MHCs vary greatly in their daily op118
erations, eligibility requirements, and procedural safeguards, they
share unifying characteristics. First, MHCs possess a “problem-solving
119
orientation,” requiring unique success measurements. Thus, rather
than evaluating effectiveness by traditional criteria (such as convictions), MHC stakeholders assess achievement in terms of treatment
120
provision and illness mitigation. By addressing systematic problems
through novel methods and measurements, MHCs demonstrate dis121
satisfaction with standard case processing and “business as usual.”
122
Therapeutic
Second, MHCs use “therapeutic jurisprudence.”
123
jurisprudence is an interdisciplinary legal approach emphasizing
the creation of beneficial consequences via legal actors, rules, and

Mental health courts represent a multi-agency and systemwide response to the problem of untreated mental illness . . . .
Id.; see also Winick, supra note 32, at 1059. Broward County’s MHC is a misdemeanor
court for “people arrested for minor offenses whose major problem is mental illness
rather than criminality.” Id. (citing Petrila et al., supra note 54, at 15–16).
116
Pessin, supra note 56, at 8. “By acknowledging that crime isn’t always a function of a person’s nefarious intentions, courts are passing up on punishment in favor
of therapy.” Id.
117
O’Neal, supra note 62.
118
See GOLDKAMP & IRONS-GUYNN, supra note 42.
119
See GREG BERMAN, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, THE HARDEST SELL? PROBLEMSOLVING JUSTICE AND THE CHALLENGES OF STATEWIDE IMPLEMENTATION 2 (2004), available at http://www.courtinnovation.org/pdf/hardest_sell.pdf (noting the problemsolving orientation requires a “significant shift in judicial orientation”).
120
See id.; see also Jennifer Skeem & John Petrila, Problem-Solving Supervision: Specialty Probation for Individuals with Mental Illnesses, 40 CT. REV. 8 (2004) (recognizing
that problem-solving courts attempt to achieve outcomes that extend beyond the judicial system’s traditional goals, thus responding to larger social problems invading
on the justice system).
121
See DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 35, at 8 (citing HOWARD FINKELSTEIN &
DOUGLAS BRAWLEY, BROWARD COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE, INTRODUCTION;
BROWARD COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH COURT STATUS REPORT (1997), http://www.
browarddefender.com/mhealth/volume_i_mental_health.htm#VolI,No.I (last visited
Feb. 15, 2006)).
122
Id. at 9.
123
The therapeutic jurisprudence theory was first coined in 1987 by Professor
David Wexler in a paper to the National Institute of Mental Health. Peggy Fulton
Hora et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Drug Treatment Court Movement: Revolutionizing the Criminal Justice System’s Response to Drug Abuse and Crime in America, 74 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 439, 442 n.8 (1999).
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124

procedures. Fundamental to therapeutic jurisprudence is a notion
that therapeutic options (options promoting mental health that
compliment judicial values), improve efficacy by serving individuals
125
and their problems. Thus, in various manners, MHCs direct attention away from the docket’s binary dispute and towards the offender’s
126
and community’s needs.
Third, MHC legal actors perform non-traditional roles, redefin127
ing adversarialism and relaxing courtroom proceedings.
These
modern roles require increased judicial monitoring of MHC participants, as offenders frequently return to court allowing judicial as128
sessment of their treatment’s progression. The interaction with the
bench is consistent with therapeutic jurisprudence, as judges directly
129
engage participants, encouraging modified behavior.
This active
judiciary is consistent with the problem-solving approach of handling
difficult situations and not delegating problems to other governmen130
tal actors.
124

See Carolyn Copps Hartley & Carrie J. Petrucci, Justice, Ethics, and Interdisciplinary Teaching and Practice: Practicing Culturally Competent Therapeutic Jurisprudence: A
Collaboration Between Social Work and Law, 14 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 133, 137 (2004)
(citing ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE xi (David B. Wexler and Bruce J.
Winick eds., 1991) (stating that therapeutic jurisprudence “asks how the law itself
might serve as a therapeutic agent without displacing due process”)).
125
See LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY xvii (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds.,
1996).
Legal rules, legal procedures, and the roles of legal actors (such as lawyers and judges) constitute social forces that, like it or not, often produce therapeutic or antitherapeutic consequences. Therapeutic jurisprudence proposes that we be sensitive to those consequences, and
that we ask whether the law’s antitherapeutic consequences can be reduced, and its therapeutic consequences enhanced, without subordinating due process and other justice values.
Id.; see also Rottman, supra note 95, at 22 (recognizing that a problem-solving orientation is more appropriate and effective for cases involving mental illness); David
Rottman & Pamela Casey, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Emergence of Problem-Solving
Courts, NAT’L INST. JUST. J. 12, 14 (July 1999) (“Therapeutic jurisprudence claims that
attending to the individuals as well as the issues involved in a case leads to more effective dispositions.”) (citing Sandra Janoff, The Influence of Legal Education on Moral
Reasoning, 76 MINN. L. REV. 194, 195 (1991)).
126
E.g., Rottman & Casey, supra note 125, at 14.
127
See DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 35, at 9 (noting MHCs have a nonadversarial dynamic). This non-adversarial dynamic is also highlighted by the collaboration among parties to MHC proceedings. Nancy J. Needell, M.D. & Judge Matthew D’Emic, The Brooklyn Mental Health Court—A Collaborative Effort, PSYCHIATRIC
TIMES, May 1, 2005, at 10.
128
See, e.g., Needell & D’Emic, supra note 126.
129
See, e.g., BERMAN, supra note 119, at 3.
130
Center for Court Innovation, http://www.problem-solvingcourts.org/ps_char.
html (last visited Feb. 15, 2006) (recognizing propensity of traditional courts to pass-
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In addition to the three common characteristics, MHCs share a
common vision. At its broadest, the purpose of MHCs is to qualitatively improve individual and social outcomes for offenders with un131
derlying mental illnesses.
However, secondary goals abound.
MHCs desire to improve public safety and formulate compassionate
132
treatment for mental disorders. MHCs seek to decriminalize men133
134
tal illness, while reducing recidivism. Ultimately, these secondary
objectives seek to end the mental illness/criminal behavior cycle by
135
providing viable treatment in lieu of criminal sanctions.
D. Mental Health Court Proliferation
Recognizing the extensive criminal justice problems associated
136
with mental illness and the “positive results” of early MHCs in Broward County, Florida and King County, Washington, the federal government acted. Congress enacted “America’s Law Enforcement and
Mental Health Project,” which President Bill Clinton signed on No137
vember 13, 2000.
The bipartisan Act, sponsored by Senator Mike
off cases to other courts, probation departments, etc.). According to Martha Metter,
a community support worker with the Crider Center for mental health in St. Charles
County, Missouri, the county’s mental health drug court team is “a little family” that
actively supports the court’s clients. Valerie Schremp Hahn, Court Helps Troubled People: County’s New Mental Health Court Provides Clients With What May be the First Stable
Relationship of Their Lives, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 6, 2005, at 1.
131
Rottman, supra note 95, at 22 (“The purpose of the new specialized courts is to
qualitatively improve outcomes for litigants and society in cases involving individuals
with underlying social and emotional problems.”). Further, the King County MHC
mission statement states, “the purpose of the mental health court is to insure that
mentally ill people are treated with dignity and provided with the opportunity for
treatment while at the same time protecting the public’s safety” and “preventing
criminalization of the mentally ill.” Faraci, supra note 75, at 824.
132
See NEISWENDER, supra note 105, at 2.
133
See Nancy Bartley, Help, Not Punishment, for Mentally Ill: King County’s Mental
Health Court Making a Difference, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 20, 2001, at B1.
134
See DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 35, at 7; Bartley, supra note 133.
135
BAZELON, supra note 38, at 5.
The goals of these mental health courts, then, are 1) to break the cycle
of worsening mental illness and criminal behavior that begins with the
failure of the community health system and is accelerated by the inadequacy of treatment in prisons and jails and 2) to provide effective
treatment options instead of the usual criminal sanctions for offenders
with mental illnesses.
Id.; see also Shoaf, supra note 31, at 976, 988 (stating the Akron MHC’s goal “is to
transition the client from a highly restrictive environment involving intensive case
management to a much less restrictive environment involving minimal case management.” Stated more simply, the MHC’s goal is “to divert mentally ill non-violent
repeat offenders from jail and into treatment.”).
136
42 U.S.C.S. § 3796ii (LEXIS through Jan. 11, 2006).
137
E.g., id.; Keele, supra note 36, at 197.
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DeWine and Representative Ted Strickland, made federal funds
available to localities establishing or expanding MHCs. The Attorney
General gained authority to grant funds to 100 programs that involve,
“continuing judicial supervision, including periodic review, over preliminarily qualified offenders with mental illness . . . ; and the coordinated delivery of services,” including: specialized stakeholder training; voluntary outpatient mental health treatment; centralized case
139
management; and continued treatment supervision.
Since then,
the federal program, which makes ten million dollars available per
year from 2001–2004, provided grants to thirty-seven courts in 2002
140
141
and 2003. This legislative action propelled an MHC explosion, as
142
by December 2005, 113 MHCs existed in thirty-five states.
The number of MHCs may again expand due to federal legislation. Sponsored by Senators DeWine and Dick Durbin and signed
into law by President George W. Bush, the “Mentally Ill Offender
143
Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2004” created a new, fiveyear grant program to fund states and localities seeking to establish
mental health courts, provide in-jail treatment and transitional ser144
vices, and provide training to mental health court stakeholders.
138

Watson et al., supra note 50, at 480.
42 U.S.C.S. § 3796ii (LEXIS through Jan.11, 2006). The Act calls for the creation of programs to train court and law enforcement personnel to recognize mentally ill offenders, to provide voluntary mental health treatment as a diversion from
criminal sanctions, to centralize case management by coordinating treatment plans
with the provision of social services, and to provide continuity in psychiatric care after release. Id.
140
See SURVEY OF MENTAL HEALTH COURTS FEBRUARY 2005, supra note 8.
141
The proliferation of MHCs mimics the proliferation of drug courts. BERMAN &
FEINBLATT, PROBLEM SOLVING, supra note 39, at 5. For example, in 1989, the first
drug court was opened in Dade County, Florida. Id. at 4. Five years later, the Crime
Act was passed, authorizing the Attorney General to make grants to establish drug
courts. Id. As of October 2003, 1091 drug courts existed, with another 413 in the
planning stages. Michael C. Dorf & Jeffrey A. Fagan, Problem-Solving Courts: From Innovation to Institutionalization, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1501, 1503 (2003) (citing OJP
DRUG COURT CLEARINGHOUSE, DRUG COURT ACTIVITY UPDATE: OCT. 15, 2003). But see
Pessin, supra note 56, at 8 (numbering drug courts nationwide at 1800). Since their
inception, more than 226,000 defendants have participated in drug court-related
programs. Aubrey Fox & Greg Berman, Going to Scale: A Conversation About the Future
of Drug Courts, 39 CT. REV. 4, 4 (2002). The speed of drug court proliferation has
been called “break-neck.” Faraci, supra note 75, at 811.
142
See SURVEY OF MENTAL HEALTH COURTS DECEMBER 2005, supra note 22 (defining
MHCs as “courts that: are adult criminal courts; have a separate docket dedicated to
persons with mental illnesses; divert criminal defendants from jail into treatment
programs; and monitor the defendants during treatment and have the ability to impose criminal sanctions for failure to comply.”).
143
42 U.S.C.S. § 3797aa (LEXIS through Jan.11, 2006).
144
Id.
139
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Most notably, the Act authorizes the Department of Justice to appropriate fifty million dollars in 2005, with additional grant funding for
145
2006 to 2009 to be determined.
E. Mental Health Court Effectiveness
MHCs did not proliferate simply due to federal funding. MHCs
146
also grew exponentially due to their effectiveness, specifically in re147
For example, Broward County’s MHC signifiducing recidivism.
148
Notably, from October
cantly mitigated revolving door problems.
2001 to September 2002, only 27% of MHC participants were rear149
rested. Further, none of the first 675 participants have since com-

145

Id. § 3797aa(h).
Idaho State Senator Dick Compton said of his state’s two MHCs in Coeur
d’Alene and Idaho Falls, which both began on an experimental basis: “Once in a
while a gem comes along that you say, ‘Thank God,’. . . . The figures are extraordinary—from people not in jail to people who go to work, believe it or not, after living
under a bridge. Josh Wright, Mental Health Courts Win Senate Approval; Bills Would Expand Program Statewide, Provide Funding, SPOKESMAN-REV. (Spokane, Wash.), Mar. 30,
2005, at B2. Anecdotal evidence verifying the impact of MHCs is abundant. For example, during a Nevada Senate Human Resources and Education Subcommittee
meeting, Walter Bliss, the father of a schizophrenic man who, after numerous encounters with law enforcement, was placed into the Clark County Mental Health
Court, said: “This mental health court is absolutely necessary. It is so relaxing for us
to have some peace in our life and know that (our son) is having the care that he
needs.” Sean Whaley, Clark County: Praises Sung for Mental Health Court, LAS VEGAS
REV.-J., Feb. 19, 2005, at 4B. A more recent example is the case of a twenty-five yearold immigrant from Barbados who participated in the Brooklyn MHC. Leslie Eaton
& Leslie Kaufman, Judges Turn Therapist in Problem-Solving Court, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26,
2005, at A1. According to Mary Elizabeth Anderson, a lawyer with the Legal Aid Society, “He would have been in jail without . . . [the MHC], there is no doubt.” Id.
147
See Kondo, supra note 47, at 302 (“[V]isionary political leaders may pioneer
state judiciary experimentation based upon past successes reported by other specialty
courts in distant jurisdictions.”); see also Clay Barbour, Court Doles Out Compassion, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 3, 2005, at A1 (quoting Marcia Wikenhauser, executive
director of Madison County’s Mental Health Board, “[MHCs] only make sense . . . .
They get people into treatment, rather than letting them languish in jail.”). Additionally, Judge Michael McLaughlin stated that, as to recidivism, MHC “participants
have six times the success of defendants diagnosed with mental illnesses but who do
not go through mental health court.” Michael McLaughlin, Mental Health Court Benefits Defendants, Our Community, IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 6, 2005, at 6.
148
See Timothy Dodson, Face to Face: A Conversation with Ginger Lerner-Wren, SUNSENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), Jan. 30, 2005, at 5H. According to Judge Wren, the
current recidivism rate for mentally ill offenders in Broward County’s MHC is approximately 12%. Id. This is a significant decrease from the court’s earlier recidivism percentage which was approximately 30%. Bergal, supra note 29. “It’s awesome
that seven out of 10 aren’t re-offending . . . . It demonstrates that treatment works
and recovery is possible. [This recidivism rate is] surprisingly low.” Id.
149
Bergal, supra note 29.
146
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150

mitted a violent offense. This reduced recidivism cleared Broward
County’s jail of an entire inmate class: the mentally ill non-violent
151
misdemeanant.
Additionally, King County, Washington, another “original”
152
MHC, slowed the revolving door, drastically reducing recidivism.
Recidivism appreciably decreased, as 75% of King County MHC
graduates committed no offenses in the year following their gradua153
tion, while 85% committed one offense or less in that time period.
Declining crime reduced violence, as the occurrence of violent
154
criminal activity among MHC participants decreased by nearly 88%.
These reductions had noteworthy institutional effects, as jail time de155
creased by over 90%.
Impressive recidivism reduction has not been limited to the
founding MHCs. Rather, triumphs occurred nationwide. In Davidson County, Tennessee, mentally ill recidivism rates dropped by 50%,
156
now down to 5.2%.
In Downtown Brooklyn, probation violations
157
for MHC clients is 38% lower than for the general population. In
Alaska, the Jail Alternative Services Program significantly reduced ar158
In Clark County, Oregon, 54% of particirests and prison stays.

150

Kondo, supra note 47, at 311 (citing Kim Barker, New Court Tries Prevention,
SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 21, 1999, at B1).
151
See id. (citing Linda Wertheimer & Robert Siegel, Hour 2: Broward County, Florida’s Mental Health Court Helps Clear Out Some of the Jail Population by Dealing with the
Mentally Ill Who’ve Committed Non-violent Misdemeanors (National Public Radio broadcast, Mar. 12, 1999)).
152
See Pub. L. No. 106-515, § 2, 114 Stat. 2399, 2399 (2000) (lauding the “positive
results” of King County); GOLDKAMP & IRONS-GUYNN, supra note 42 (examining four
of the founding MHCs already in existence prior to April 2000: Broward County,
Florida; King County, Washington; Anchorage, Alaska; and San Bernardino, California. The King County MHC began operation in February 1999 and is thus one of the
most established MHCs in the nation.).
153
NEISWENDER, supra note 105, at 6.
154
Id. at 4.
155
Id. at 7.
156
Castaneda, supra note 13 (noting recidivism rates were originally 56.3%, according to MHC Judge Andrei Lee).
157
Bill Hughes, Mental Health Court Offers Options for Many Defendants, J. NEWS
(Westchester County, N.Y.), April 14, 2004, at 6A. Judge Matthew D’Emic estimates
that 50% of the general population violates probation, compared to only 12% of
MHC clients. Id.
158
Carns et al., supra note 114, at 29 (citing Christopher M. Hamilton & Steven L.
Hamilton, Jail Alternative Service Program Evaluation 1, 8–14 (2000) (on file with
the Alaska Judicial Council)). Arrests averaged 3.4 per participant in the twelve
months prior to the JAS program and 1.4 during the program. Id. Additionally, the
program’s inception led to a reduction of the average jail stay from 30.2 days to 22.6
days during the same period. Id.
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pants tracked were not rearrested within a year, total arrests among
159
the group dropped 400%, and parole violations decreased 62%.
In Tennessee’s Metro Mental Health Court, after five years of
160
operation, the recidivism rate is less than 10%.
Additionally, a
Washoe County, Nevada case study found a crime rate reduced from
161
4.5 arrests per year, to only one arrest since enrolling.
Since the
court’s inception in 2001, jail and emergency services have been re162
Clark County, Nevada has also seen dramatic reduced by 85%.
sults. In the year prior to participation in MHC, the thirty-three cli163
ents amassed 3529 days in jail and were arrested 129 times.
However, since the court’s creation in December 2003, the clients
164
have spent 777 days in jail following only forty-nine arrests.
Another Nevada MHC, the Reno court, has also seen success. There, in
the year prior to MHC participation, forty participants averaged 528
165
days in the hospital.
But since completing the court-mandated
program, the same forty individuals collectively spent ninety-three
166
days in the hospital. In Clark County, Illinois, 85% of participants
167
have not been arrested on new charges since participating in MHC.
St. Louis County Municipal MHC has dismissed the charges against
95% of participants, following successful completion of prescribed
168
treatment. Finally, 84% of people served by the Allegheny County,

159

Holley Gilbert, Mental Health Court Proves Its Value, OREGONIAN, June 29, 2004,

at B1.
160

Burke, supra note 73.
Voyles, supra note 10. Jail time fell from an average of fifty nights in jail in the
year prior to enrollment to only twenty-two nights in jail after enrollment. Id.
162
Zamna Avila, Judge Hands Out Praise—or Stern Warnings—in Courtroom, RENO
GAZETTE-J., Oct. 28, 2005, at 1G. Judge Peter Breen referred to his ability to help
people resurrect their lives as “intoxicating.” Id.
163
Whaley, supra note 146.
164
Id.
165
Nevada Legislators Urged to Fund Mental-Health Housing, MENTAL HEALTH WKLY.
DIG., Mar. 14, 2005, at 10 (paraphrasing Harold Cook of the Reno MHC Mental
Health Division).
166
Id. Additionally, the same forty offenders were arrested a total of forty-five
times in the year prior to court participation and since, they have been arrested eight
times collectively. Id.
167
Pessin, supra note 56, at 8. Additionally, in the year prior to joining the program, the average total of days spent in custody for the court’s twenty-six participants
was 102. Id. After nine months in the program, however, the participants have averaged six-and-a-half days per person in custody (and 60% of that time was served by
just two offenders). Id.
168
Barbour, supra note 147.
161
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Pennsylvania, MHC have “stayed out of trouble with the law” while
169
170
under the MHC’s supervision. And the list of successes goes on.
II. THE PROBLEM—MHCS ESTABLISHED AS PILOT PROGRAMS
Since the 1997 birth of the nation’s first MHC in Broward
County, many MHCs have been established as pilot programs, including the “founding” MHCs in King County, San Bernardino, Califor171
172
The pilot model, however, relied upon in
nia, and Anchorage.
173
the MHC movement’s formative years has remained popular.
Evidencing this short-sighted perspective is New Jersey’s legislature,
which considered four proposals in three legislative sessions for the
174
establishment of a pilot MHC. By advocating pilot programs, policymakers in the Garden State and across America continue envision175
ing MHCs as experimental.
169

Joe Fahy, Special Court Making Inroads Treating Mentally Ill Criminals, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 31, 2005, at B-3. According to a report by the Criminal Justice/Mental Health Consensus Project, the number of participants who had subsequent legal problems was “remarkably low.” Id.
170
These impressive results continue to occur in other MHCs throughout the nation. See Brutzman, supra note 73 (In Greenville County, South Carolina, forty-three
offenders participated in the MHC in its inaugural year of 2002. In 2002, those individuals were arrested sixty-one times. Since entering the program, those individuals
accounted for only twenty-six arrests.); Jeff Coen, Mental Court Nets Stable Results; Only
1 of 35 Guilty of New Felony in Year, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 17, 2005, at 3 (In Cook County’s
MHC, thirty-five individuals were processed in its first calendar year. Only one individual was convicted of a new felony, a stark contrast considering that the same
group of individuals averaged four arrests and two convictions each in the previous
year and spent a total of 4000 days in custody.); Court Programs Save Lives and Money,
OLYMPIAN (Olympia, Wash.), Oct. 3, 2005, at 7A (In Thurston County, Washington,
the eighteen people participating in the six-month trial MHC had been previously
booked 35 times. Since entering the MHC, only two bookings have occurred for all
eighteen).
171
GOLDKAMP & IRONS-GUYNN, supra note 42 (discussing the creation of the nation’s first MHCs).
172
See Carns et al., supra note 114, at 23.
173
See, e.g., Ken Kobayashi, Prisoners With Mental Problems Released For Care,
HONOLULU ADVERTISER, June 19, 2005, at 31A (noting the early accomplishments of
the state’s first MHC, which was part of a pilot program); Pessin, supra note 56, at 8
(noting that the Cook County, Illinois, MHC is a pilot program)
174
Assemb. A1279, 211th Leg. (N.J. 2004) (proposing a “Mental Health Court Pilot Program” in Essex County); Assemb. A3867, 210th Leg. (N.J. 2003) (advocating
for and appropriating $1.8 million to a “pilot program for mentally ill offenders”);
Assemb. AR222, 210th Leg. (N.J. 2002) (memorializing the judiciary to establish a
MHC pilot program); Assemb. A2355, 209th Leg. (N.J. 2000) (seeking to establish a
“Mental Health Court Pilot Program”).
175
See Khurram Saeed, Jail Study Finds 16% Mentally Ill, J. NEWS (Westchester
County, N.Y.), Oct. 8, 2004, at 1A. Specifically, MHC advocates in Rockland County,
New York, advocated for a pilot MHC for the past three years. Id.
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Despite the political palatability of pilot programs, this MHC establishment model has shortcomings, most notably inadequate funding. “Predictably, the greatest barrier to establishment of state
[MHCs] is in obtaining adequate political and financial support for
such programs. Ultimately, state legislators, policy-makers, and citizens hold the purse strings to authorize and permit creation of these
176
specialty courts.” This abstract assertion’s truth persists. For example, in Jackson County, Oregon, despite near unanimous support
177
among county officials for an MHC, an obstacle remains: money.
Beyond the difficulties of raising adequate start-up funds, MHCs
must sustain ample funding. The anecdotal evidence depicting
178
MHCs struggling to maintain sufficient funding abounds.
A paramount cause of the growing pains confronting existing MHCs is un179
In the National Alliance of the
due reliance on grant funding.
180
Mentally Ill’s February 2005 Survey of Mental Health Courts, nearly
181
78% of responding courts utilized grant funding, while 69% of
182
those courts relied solely on grant money. This inordinate reliance
on grants led the Superior Court of California, County of Placer to
183
state that the “[s]cope of future operations [is] to be determined,”
which is strikingly similar to the language directed at two past Cali184
fornia MHCs that are no longer listed in the survey. The negative
results stemming from dependence upon grant funding generated
unflattering analogies such as comparing the federal government to

176

Kondo, supra note 47, at 302.
Lemon, supra note 11 (noting the comments of Jim Adams, Circuit Court administrator for Jackson County, and Christine Herbert, a Medford criminal defense
attorney); see also O’Neal, supra note 62. This problem extends to various MHCs.
According to Hamilton County General Sessions Court Judge Bob Moon,
“[p]sychiatric defendants would most likely benefit from an exclusive mental health
court, as would the general public. . . . However . . . it appears to me that tax dollar
appropriations at this time or such a court is unlikely.” Id.
178
See supra notes 1–12 and accompanying text.
179
See Burke, supra note 73 (“It [the Metro MHC] barely survived a budget crunch
this year after its federal grant expired.”).
180
SURVEY OF MENTAL HEALTH COURTS FEBRUARY 2005, supra note 8.
181
Id. Fifty-four of the nation’s then existing 107 MHCs reported funding information. Id. Forty-two MHCs relied to some extent on federal, state, and/or other
grants for funding. Id.
182
See id. Twenty-nine courts reported only grants as a source of funding. Id.
183
SURVEY OF MENTAL HEALTH COURTS FEBRUARY 2005, supra note 8.
184
Id. The July 2004 survey indicated that “[f]uture funding [is] uncertain” for
the Superior Court of California, County of Santa Barbara, which relied upon a
Board of Corrections grant. See SURVEY OF MENTAL HEALTH COURTS JULY 2004, supra
note 8, at 10.
177
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heroin dealers who “give these grants to start these programs and
185
they then take them away.”
In short, planners establishing pilot courts relying purely on
grant money are incorrectly conceptualizing MHCs. Such planners
fail to recognize the challenges confronting existing MHCs and fail to
adhere to the prevailing opinion that MHCs are no longer experi186
mental, but rather are permanent components of American justice.
“[L]awyers generally agree that specialized courts are here to stay.
The alternative is for courts to be the dumping grounds for individuals with psychological problems. The court system should acknowl187
edge this reality and gear for it.”
188
The institutionalization of MHCs continues, despite the funding crisis faced by this new breed of problem-solving courts. According to Professor John Goldkamp, of Temple University:
[W]hat we have now is not a bunch of little hobbies that judges
have in isolated jurisdictions, but rather a paradigm shift that larger court systems are trying to come to grips with. They’re at your
door step. The question isn’t: Gosh, are courts supposed to be
doing this? It’s: What are you going to do about it? How does it
fit in? It’s no longer a question of whether this should have been
189
invented. They’re here.

Questions abound and solutions are needed. How can MHCs
garner community support from officials, the public, the media, and
the legal community? How can MHCs secure adequate financial stability? How can MHCs ensure a sufficient employment pool to replenish judges and court officials? What types of infrastructure must
MHCs implement to sustain growth, improve outcomes, and enhance
the lives of mentally ill offenders and their communities?

185

Symposium, The Changing Face of Justice: The Evolution of Problem Solving, 29
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1790, 1798 (2002) [hereinafter The Evolution of Problem Solving]
(quoting comments of Judge Morris B. Hoffman, Denver District Court).
186
See BERMAN & FEINBLATT, PROBLEM SOLVING, supra note 39, at 14 (“Problemsolving courts have achieved a kind of critical mass. They are no longer just a set of
isolated experiments driven by entrepreneurial judges and administrators”).
187
Davis, supra note 85, at 37 (continuing on to quote John Feinblatt of the Center for Court Innovation, who said, “Problem-solving, focused courts ought to populate the landscape more densely.”).
188
Institutionalization has been defined as a process by which individualized
courts “evolve from separate experimental entities to a statewide network that is stable, far-reaching, reliably funded and closely monitored.” FOX & WOLF, supra note
99, at 3 (discussing the institutionalization of drug courts).
189
Berman, supra note 17, at 85 (comments of John Goldkamp).
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III. THE SOLUTION
Prospective action is needed from MHC advocates. The pilot
model of MHC establishment should be abandoned in favor of
strategies providing the resources, funding, and infrastructure necessary to maintain MHCs indefinitely. Planners must increase community support, secure long-term funding, provide for personnel replenishment, and create adequate infrastructure to mitigate and rectify
the “growing pains” of MHCs.
A. Community Support
Community support is critical in establishing MHCs. “[W]e’ve
learned that courts can’t carry out this problem-solving role alone.
Collaborations with government agencies and community groups are
190
essential.”
But, the acquisition of broad community support requires the articulation of a nuanced message to convince stake191
holders of the importance, necessity, and viability of MHCs.
Legislation is central to increase public support for MHCs, as
192
court establishment requires political savvy. Such orchestration requires maneuvering around “thorny political issues” including selecting an agency responsible for the courts, promoting MHCs despite
alternative policy approaches, and convincing policymakers to con193
tinue funding during fiscal downturns.
In short, state legislators
194
Once polimust be convinced, since they control appropriations.
cymakers are persuaded, the legislatures can enact three types of leg-

190

Kaye, supra note 97, at 13
Cf. FOX & WOLF, supra note 99, at 9 (noting the successful “salesmanship” of
drug court practioners by crafting a “nuanced message” that “appeals to a broad political spectrum”).
192
Cf. id at 10–11, 46 (discussing legislation’s role in the proliferation of drug
courts).
193
See id. at 46.
194
See Kondo, supra note 47, at 302. Persuasion of legislators will lead to MHC
funding. For example, Nevada Assemblyman William Horne introduced Assembly
Bill 41 to provide $1 million per year for a MHC. Whaley, supra note 146; see also Nevada Legislators Urged to Fund Mental-Health Housing, supra note 165 (stating that the
legislation sponsored by Assemblyman Horne will allocate $2 million to the Clark
County MHC, in addition to providing funding for the Reno and newly established
Carson City MHCs). The great power state legislatures wield is also evident in Maine.
There, the criminal justice community is closely watching the efficacy of the Kennebec County MHC. Judy Harrison, New Maine Court Under Way; System Seeks to Reduce
Incarceration of People with Mental Illness, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Sept. 19, 2005, at B1.
Currently, the court is being funded by a three-year grant from the United States
Department of Justice. Id. However, for MHC operations to continue after the grant
money runs dry, the state legislature must fund the court. Id.
191
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islation supporting MHCs and problem-solving justice.
First, the
legislature can enact enabling legislation, which makes MHCs more
politically palatable, attracts the legal community’s attention, and
196
garners public support via awareness campaigns. Second, the legislature can enact indirect legislation, or legislation that does not spe197
These legislative
cifically mention MHCs nor their development.
actions, such as resolutions creating task forces to examine mental
198
health issues, are an effective, historical impetus for MHC estab199
Third, it can enact legislation requiring MHC establishlishment.
200
ment. This coercive legislation, utilized in Texas to mandate problem-solving courts in seven, highly-populated, urban counties, is the
201
most aggressive approach to court establishment.
While support from policymakers is essential in MHC establishment, political approval will not coalesce without broad community
202
support. “[A] prominent challenge within the mental health court
system is to educate the public and to provide a common understand195

FOX & WOLF, supra note 99, at 10–13.
Cf. id. at 10–11 (discussing enabling legislation in the drug court context). An
example of enabling legislation would be a legislatively approved study to determine
the feasibility and beneficiality of MHC establishment. Such a study, involving a review of data related to mental health-related cases, has been proposed by Representative Jeannie McDaniel in the Oklahoma legislature. Marie Price, Lawmaker Seeks Creation of Mental Health Court, TULSA WORLD, July 3, 2005, at A12.
197
Cf. FOX & WOLF, supra note 99, at 11–12 (discussing indirect legislation in the
drug court context). For example, Ohio has no legislation prescribing drug court
operation, yet numerous laws support their process. Id.
198
New Jersey may also utilize indirect legislation to create a MHC, as after four
failed MHC pilot program proposals, the legislature is considering a bill that will create a multi-disciplinary “Task Force to Improve the Treatment of Offenders with
Mental Illness.” Assemb. A2518, 211th Leg. (N.J. 2004) available at http://www.
njleg.state.nj.us. The Assembly unanimously approved the bill (79-0). Id. Though
the Senate has yet to vote, the Senate Law and Public Safety and Veteran’s Affairs
Committee reported favorably on the bill. Sen. S1509, 211th Leg. (N.J. 2004).
199
Task force creation, a possibility that may arise through indirect legislation, has
historically been a catalyst for MHC creation. The nation’s first MHC in Broward
County was the product of a task force, Lerner-Wren, supra note 106, at 2, as was the
King County MHC. Watson et al., supra note 50, at 479 (citing James D. Cayce &
Kare Burrell, King County’s Mental Health Court: An Innovative Approach for Coordinating
Justice Services, WASH. STATE B. NEWS, June 1999, at 19–23).
200
Cf. FOX & WOLF, supra note 99, at 12–13 (discussing coercive legislation in the
drug court context).
201
Id. at 12.
202
See The Birth of a Problem Solving Court, supra note 48, at 1760–61 (statement of
Harlem Community Court’s Rolando Acosta) (“[T]he planning team [of the problem-solving Harlem Justice Center] understood that the success of the Justice Center
was going to be largely dependent upon the full support of the community in which
the Center would be located. The community itself had to buy into the innovative
community-based approach of dispensing justice.”).
196
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203

ing of the benefits and the costs of the program . . . .”
Positively,
mobilizing community support may not be difficult, as a 2001 National Center for State Courts survey found strong support already ex204
isting for common problem-solving strategies. A “solid majority of
205
This
the public” supports the methods of problem-solving justice.
sponsorship is particularly passionate among minority groups, as over
80% of African-Americans and Latinos support hiring counselors and
206
social workers.
Additionally, support extends beyond minority
groups and includes various organizations concerned with the men207
tally ill’s plight, such as the Council of State Governments, the
American Jail Association, the American Correctional Association,
the American Sheriff’s Association, and the National Mental Health
208
Association, all of which endorse MHC establishment.
Despite this support, the community’s endorsement can never
be too strong. Thus, a communications strategy must be constructed
209
to “spread the gospel” of MHCs and problem-solving justice. Planners and advocates can employ various techniques, including direct
pubic communication and media utilization. Additionally, planners
should encourage judges to publicly advocate for MHC establishment
and maintenance.
Direct communication campaigns can occur in various manners,
all of which will be implemented by proficient MHC advocates. At
the most democratic level, MHC advocates should conduct town
meetings where MHCs’ values are espoused, public questions are an210
swered, and invaluable community input is received. This intimate
interaction leads to a more symbiotic and efficient court/community

203

Keele, supra note 36, at 203.
BERMAN, supra note 119, at 6. The survey found support for the hiring of
treatment staff and social workers, offenders reporting back to court on their treatment progress, coordinated work among local agencies to treat offenders, and utilizing relevant experts to assist courts in decision-making. Id.
205
DAVID B. ROTTMAN & RANDALL M. HANSEN, HOW RECENT COURT USERS VIEW THE
STATE COURTS: PERCEPTIONS OF WHITES, AFRICAN AMERICANS, AND LATINOS 3 (1999),
available at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/Res_AmtPTC_RecentCt
UsersViewPTCPub.pdf.
206
Id.
207
Skeem & Petrila, supra note 120, at 8. The Council of State Government recognized MHCs as a “workable” option for communities with limited resources.
CONSENSUS PROJECT, supra note 46, at 6.
208
Kondo, supra note 47, at 309 (citing DeWine, CONGRESSIONAL PRESS RELEASE,
supra note 68, at 2).
209
BERMAN, supra note 119, at 5.
210
See BERMAN & FEINBLATT, JUDGES, supra note 88, at 21.
204
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211

relationship, which, in turn, allows partnerships to forge, increases
212
community involvement, and creates a more responsive court. Additionally, Internet communication provides an efficient, cost213
effective, and practical communications medium.
Notably, the
King County MHC website publishes a fact sheet, task force recommendations, media coverage, downloadable court forms, frequently
214
asked questions, statistics, and mental health resource links.
Another strategy for increasing public support is the controlled
215
use of media attention. To increase public support, MHCs should
capitalize upon free ink by exploiting media avenues, including creating public service announcements, encouraging op-ed submissions,
and conducting public events designed, in part, to attract media cov216
erage.
Such strategies are effectively implemented by numerous
problem-solving courts (e.g., National Public Radio and Good Morn211

See id. Judge John Leventhal, of the Brooklyn Domestic Violence Court, hosts
monthly meetings in the courthouse. Id. Attendees include prosecutors, defenders,
victim advocates, batterers-intervention programs, service providers, religious leaders, and community activists. Id. The meetings led to new protocols that allowed the
court to improve efficacy. Id.
212
See Randal B. Fritzler, How One Misdemeanor Mental Health Court Incorporates
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Preventive Law, and Restorative Justice, in MANAGEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE: POLICY, PRACTICE, ADMINISTRATION
at 17 (Jacqueline Moore ed., 2003).
213
Kondo, supra note 47, at 315 (arguing for increased on-line interaction among
MHC advocates, which would permit “mutual communication and sharing of ‘best
court practices’”). Notably, as of February 2005 at least forty-four MHCs had operating websites devoted to the problem-solving court. See SURVEY OF MENTAL HEALTH
COURTS FEBRUARY 2005, supra note 8.
214
Kondo, supra note 47, at 315; see also Mental Health Court Home Page, King
County District Court, http://www.metrokc.gov/kcdc/mhindex.htm (last visited
Feb. 15, 2006).
215
This strategy has been employed by MHC’s role model, drug courts. However,
the success of drug courts in attracting positive media attention has been too great,
as drug court success stories are often no longer newsworthy. FOX & WOLF, supra note
99, at 9.
[D]rug courts have been successful at attracting press coverage of drug
court graduations—in some cases, so successful that they can’t get local
newspapers to cover them any more. For example, the local press in
Boone County, Missouri, had covered so many graduations that reporters were beginning to balk at going. “Once the governor came and our
daily newspaper did not show up,” said Judge Christine Carpenter.
Their response was, “This isn’t news, you’re just using us for good PR,”
Carpenter said.
Id. Controlled use of the media can also lead to political pressure, as seen in upstate
New York where The Times Union called upon Governor George Pataki and the state
legislature to support the creation of more mental health courts. When the Accused are
Ill, TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), June 19, 2005, at E4.
216
BERMAN, supra note 119, at 5; see also Dale Hall, Twenty-One Monroe County Mental Health Court Graduates Honored, DAILY REC. OF ROCHESTER, Oct. 31, 2005.
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ing America have featured the nation’s trailblazing MHC, Broward
217
Additionally, Judge Kaye called for the establishment of
County).
218
219
more “hands-on” courts in a widely cited Newsweek commentary.
Further, MHC stakeholders, especially judges, must be public
220
advocates. By advocating MHCs through speeches and community
engagements, judges accomplish numerous goals, including: increasing comprehension of social contexts; building effective community
partnerships; and improving public trust, confidence, and opinions
221
222
of MHCs.
From their “bully pulpit,” judges can effectively and
significantly impact public attitudes and encourage problem-solving
223
justice. A judicial willingness to publicly advocate highlights MHCs’
224
benefits, making these courts a public and political priority.
Such
advocacy was recently seen in Idaho, where two MHC judges briefed
the state’s Senate Health and Welfare Committee on the importance
225
of problem-solving courts, including MHCs.
The senate subsequently passed three bills aimed at expanding MHCs within the state
226
227
and raising additional funds. All three bills passed unanimously.
Additionally, an active judiciary will impact other communications strategies. For example, a vocally active judiciary can garner
positive media coverage, as MHC judges are visible advocates possessing unique and newsworthy opportunities to convey the need for
228
MHCs.
Further, a politically savvy bench can pressure legislators
and other policymakers to support MHCs. For example, Richard
Guy, Chief Justice of the Washington State Supreme Court, encouraged voters to write their elected representatives expressing opinions

217

Lerner-Wren, supra note 106, at 4.
The article has been cited by at least 13 American law review and law journal
articles.
219
Kaye, supra note 97, at 13.
220
Rottman, supra note 95, at 23–24 (“The expertise of a specialized judge in a
particular subject matter helps the court secure community-wide support for the
court’s programs.”).
221
BERMAN & FEINBLATT, JUDGES, supra note 88, at 19.
222
BERMAN, supra note 119, at 4.
223
Id.; cf. FOX & WOLF, supra note 99, at 46 (discussing the impact of judicial
speeches, interviews, and media coverage in the drug court context).
224
Cf. FOX & WOLF, supra note 99, at 45 (discussing judges actively advocating for
drug courts).
225
Wright, supra note 146.
226
Id.
227
Id.
228
Kondo, supra note 47, at 314. For a further example of MHC judges utilizing
the media to advance the policy goals of MHCs, see Dodson, supra note 148.
218
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229

on the judiciary’s future. Such a grassroots effort could effectively
motivate policy-makers.
A final strategy for garnering additional support for MHCs is an
appeal to the legal community. Richard E. Redding, an associate
230
professor of law at Villanova University, proposed a novel method.
Professor Redding encouraged requiring law student exposure to
“mental illness, how to represent mentally ill clients, adjudicative
competence, the mental health needs of various offender groups and
231
how these unmet needs may contribute to criminal behavior . . . .”
Some law schools have exposed their students to therapeutic juris232
But, outreach to the
prudence through classroom presentations.
bar can extend beyond the classroom’s Socratic method, to bar asso233
ciations and continuing legal education seminars.
For example,
Fordham University School of Law raised awareness among legal
practitioners by hosting numerous symposiums concerning mental

229

Kondo, supra note 47, at 316 (citing Chief Justice Richard P. Guy, Justice Denied
in Washington’s Clogged Courts: Supreme Court Justice Sees Resources Lagging Far Behind,
NEWS TRIB. (Tacoma, Wash.), Jan 23, 2000, at B8).
230
See Redding, supra note 75.
Forensic mental health issues should be an integral part of the
criminal law curriculum, beginning with the first-year criminal law
course. This Article presents recommendations for teaching mental
health issues in first-year criminal law, presents empirical data indicating that first-year students have mixed,though generally positive, reactions to incorporating such non-traditional content into the course,
and provides a syllabus for an upper-level course in criminal law and
psychology. Incorporating mental health topics into the traditional
criminal law curriculum is part of the ongoing trend in legal education
towards expanding pedagogy beyond legal doctrine into relevant social
science disciplines that can inform legal policy and students’ understanding of the criminal justice system, perhaps more so than many of
the doctrinal lessons we now teach.
Id. at 407–08.
231
Id. at 407.
232
Gregory Baker & Jennifer Zawid, The Birth of a Therapeutic Courts Externship Program: Hard Labor but Worth the Effort, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 711, 728 (2005) (discussing classroom presentations made by attorneys practicing in MHCs).
233
See BERMAN, supra note 119, at 4 (discussing education and training initiatives
for judges, clerks, attorneys, court officers, and court administrators). Appropriate
examples of such efforts are the Council of State Governments June 2005 conference
titled “Mental Health Courts and Beyond: Improving the Response to People with
Mental Illness in the Criminal Justice System,” Bureau of Justice Assistance Mental
Health Court Program, http://www.consensusproject.org/mhcourts/discussion/
thread-c?msg_id=00002a (last visited Feb. 15, 2006), and the Bureau of Justice Assistance’s “Mental Health Courts Program Newsletter.” Bureau of Justice Assistance
Mental Health Court Program, http://www.consensusproject.org/mhcourts/MHCPApril-newsletter.adp (last visited Feb. 15, 2006).
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234

illness, MHCs, and problem-solving courts.
These efforts already
encountered success, as the legal profession embraces MHCs. The
Conference of Chief Justices, the Conference of State Court Adminis235
trators, and all fifty state court chief judges (with all fifty state court
236
Addiadministrators) support problem-solving justice and MHCs.
tionally, the University of Maryland Survey Research Center found
that the judiciary endorses problem-solving tools, with approximately
90% of respondents believing the judiciary should address social
problems such as mental illness and that treatment is more effective
237
than incarceration. These innovative approaches to legal education
will increase the bar’s awareness of mental illness, the problems it
creates, and available solutions.
B. Adequate Funding
Public support for MHCs is a means to an end: money. MHCs
need money to be established, to operate, and to sustain growth. Unfortunately, MHCs generally require more funding than traditional
courts due to the additional costs of corresponding community
238
health treatment. These costs could be harmful, as “[t]he (usually)
234

See, e.g., The Birth of a Problem Solving Court, supra note 48; The Evolution of Problem Solving, supra note 185.
235
BERMAN & FEINBLATT, PROBLEM SOLVING, supra note 39, at 14. The Conference
of Chief Justices and Conference of State Court Administrators passed a joint resolution pledging to “encourage the broad integration . . . of the principles and methods
employed in problem solving courts into the administration of justice.” Id.
236
Aubrey Fox & Greg Berman, Going to Scale: A Conversation About the Future of
Drug Courts, 39 CT. REV. 4, 10 (2002) (according to Kevin Burke, Chief Judge of
Hennepin County, Minnesota, “[t]he fact of the matter is that the Conference of
Chief Justices is a pretty conservative group. This may be the first time they’ve passed
an endorsement that is pro-active in nature, and it has been a great help in getting
people's attention.”).
237
Berman & Feinblatt. A Quiet Revolution, supra note 93, at 213 (highlighting a
research study surveying over five hundred criminal court judges).
238
See Keele, supra note 36, at 203. Keele states:
As in every new political venture, the majority of the pubic is concerned with funding and long-term financial support. The mental
health court system uniquely requires financial support at the court
level, as well as within the community treatment arena for a comprehensive and successful program to be administered. Therefore, a
prominent challenge within the mental health court system is to educate the public and to provide a common understanding of the benefits and the costs of the program to those who implement public policy
and provide funding to justice programs.
Id.; see also Fahy, supra note 169. According to Christy Visher, a principal researcher
associated at the Urban Institute in Washington, MHCs generally cost more to operate than traditional courts, due to the length of hearings and numerous court appearances by offenders. Id.
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higher costs associated with specialized courts may prove fatal during
239
an economic downturn.” Since funding is the major concern when
establishing MHCs, a variety of adequate funding streams must be entrenched to sustain indefinite viability.
Anecdotal evidence indicates that MHCs cannot rely solely on
grants. Currently, MHCs in eight states face severe budgetary con240
straints, mostly due to over-reliance upon grant money, while courts
in the formative stages continue to wander down the same dangerous
241
path. Rather than exist at the mercy of grants, revocable in any fis242
cal year, MHCs need permanent funding sources. Creative and innovative fund-raising is required. Morris Hoffman, of the Denver
Drug Court’s fund-raising efforts, said, “[w]e have tried to do creative
things with our general funding.” Morris Hoffman continued, “I told
everybody the other day that we need Arthur Andersen to come in
243
and set up some offshore limited partnerships.”
MHC advocates
and planners must adopt and integrate strategies, choosing from a
plethora of effective fund-raising approaches already implemented by
courts nationwide.
The first strategy MHC planners should adopt is to create multi244
245
ple funding streams. By diversifying revenue sources, MHCs will
not detrimentally rely on any single mechanism, thereby increasing
the court’s financial stability. Second, MHCs can implement a nomi246
nal surcharge to participants. For example, the Wellness Court in
239

Rottman, supra note 95, at 24. It is also important to note that problem-solving
courts in general, and specifically MHCs, “proliferated in an era of particularly generous funding,” due in large part to a robust economy. Id.
240
See supra notes 1–12 and accompanying text.
241
Two Greenville County, South Carolina Probate Court Judges, Ted Sauvain
and Debra Faulkner, are spearheading a drive to create a MHC. Brutzman, supra
note 73. In anticipation of a $150,000 operating budget, Judges Sauvain and Faulkner applied for a $110,000 grant (equal to over 73% of the operating budget) from
the state’s Department of Public Safety. Id.
242
See Voyles, supra note 10.
243
The Evolution of Problem Solving, supra note 185, at 1798.
244
Cf. id. at 1808 (discussing funding for drug courts). Multiple funding streams
are critical. Marilyn Robers of the Department of Justice said: “I want to emphasize
reallocation of resources, I want to emphasize multiple funding streams, because
drug courts cannot exist on a federal grant. They cannot exist on any one funding
stream. There are multiple resources that have to be brought to bear to make a drug
court work. ” Id.
245
Clark County, Nevada is a prime example of fund diversification. Juliet V. Casey, Court Wins Its Case, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., June 13, 2005, at 1B. During its first year of
operation, the court relied upon a federal grant of $150,000. Id. However, thanks to
new appropriations by the state legislature, the MHC will receive approximately two
million dollars in the next biennium. Id.
246
See Carns et al., supra note 114, at 18–19.
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Alaska, a problem-solving court that treats alcohol-addicted offend247
ers, emphasizes participants’ economic self-sufficiency and, therefore, requires participants to contribute towards monitoring and
248
treatment costs.
This strategy may soon be adopted in Idaho, as
legislation passed the Senate, 35-0, requiring offenders admitted into
249
the MHC to pay $300 per month to participate.
Third, MHCs can raise revenue through court instituted surcharges or fines. Several MHCs utilize this strategy. Nevada courts
implemented this strategy, as the Reno pilot MHC employs a five dol250
lar surcharge on local misdemeanor fines, while the Washoe
County MHC requires a fifteen dollar fee of all convicted misde251
meanor offenders. The Board in Cook County, Illinois, in an effort
to generate an estimated $300,000 per year and decrease reliance on
grant money by creating a more permanent funding stream, approved a ten-dollar fee to be charged to all defendants found guilty of
252
felonies or misdemeanors in the county’s circuit court. Whereas a
nominal fine imposed upon criminal offenders is unlikely to spark
public outrage, the fourth strategy for MHC fund-raising is the least
253
politically palatable: a tax increase. However, the tax surcharge has
been explored by some MHCs, specifically in Fairfield County,
254
255
256
Ohio, Jackson County, Oregon, and Dane County, Wisconsin. A
247

Id. at 29.
Id. at 18–19. Wellness Court participants may be required to pay for their electronic monitoring program which costs up to fifteen dollars per day and the cost of
certain medications which may cost $150 per month. Id.
249
Wright, supra note 146. The MHC, however, would have the power to exempt
offenders from the fee under certain circumstances. Id.
250
Nowlen, supra note 9.
251
Voyles, supra note 10.
252
Mickey Ciokajlo, Mental Health Court fee OKd, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 2, 2005, Metro, at
3; Pessin, supra note 56, at 8. See also Lisa Smith, Mental Health Court in the Works, CHI.
D. HERALD, Jan. 6, 2006, at 3 (discussing a ten dollar fee, earmarked to support the
creation of a MHC in Kane County, Illinois, to be paid by all defendants found guilty
or granted court supervision); Editorial, A Court of First Resort, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, Dec. 30, 2005, at C12 (discussing the creation of a MHC in St. Clair
County, Missouri, which shall be funded by a $10 fee charged to people convicted of
felonies and misdemeanors in the county).
253
Tim Kelly, Editorial, Use Prop. 63 Funds to Create Juvenile Court of Second Chances,
SAN GABRIEL VALLEY TRIB. (San Gabriel, Cal.), Dec. 23, 2004 (calling for the use of tax
funds to finance the creation of a juvenile mental health court).
254
Mary Beth Lane, Fairfield County Plans to Add Mental-Health Court Next Year,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Columbus, Ohio), Oct. 27, 2004, at 5B. Planners hope to utilize money from a county Alcohol Drug Addiction and Mental Health Services levy,
placed on the November 2, 2004 ballot. Id.
255
Lemon, supra note 11. According to Jim Adams, Circuit Court Administrator
for Jackson County, the state court system cannot maintain existing programs without a tax surcharge. Id.
248
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tax should be the last resort, as tax increases will detrimentally impact
public support.
Other strategies to ensure adequate funding are not revenueraising initiatives, but cost-reducing enterprises. MHCs should seek
the gratuitous service of judges, attorneys, and other MHC stake257
holders.
While such an endeavor may conflict with ensuring adequate personnel and would be unrealistic on a broad scope, voluntary
258
For example, colservices could help reduce MHC expenditures.
lege, pre-med, and law students could assist MHCs in exchange for
academic credit. The Anchorage MHC utilizes interns from the Uni259
versity of Alaska-Anchorage for staff support, and the Broward
County MHC allows doctoral students from Nova Southeastern University, under the supervision of the public defender’s mental health
260
staff, to screen clients for program participation.
261
Further, MHCs are long-term cost savers.
The MHCs’ effec262
tiveness will reduce recidivism, reduce unnecessary incarceration,
and more appropriately allocate expensive correctional facility

256

Nowlen, supra note 9. Dane County Executive Kathleen Falk believes a taxfunded MHC may be justified. Id.
257
See Shoaf, supra note 31, at 978 (noting the Akron MHC’s use of reassignment
of and expansion of job duties to obtain adequate resources for the court); see also
Carns et al., supra note 114, at 17.
Even the projects that have functioned for some period of time without
outside funding have managed only by using substantial time volunteered by judges, attorneys and other persons and organizations in the
community . . . . [T]he judges, treatment providers and attorneys involved in these projects contributed all of the time needed to plan and
bring the courts into operation.
Id. at 17–18. Voluntary services were used effectively in Kennebec County, Maine,
where a judge, prosecutor, case manager, crisis counselor, and numerous others volunteered their time to launch the county’s MHC. Harrison, supra note 194.
258
Libby Sander, Mental Health Court Thriving: Prosecutor, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Oct.
19, 2004, at 3. The DuPage County Mental Health Court originally operated solely
on the gratuitous efforts of prosecutors, public defenders, law enforcement officials,
probation officers, and mental health staff. Id.
259
Carns et al., supra note 114, at 17.
260
Petrila et al., supra note 54, at 18.
261
MHCs may even be short-term cost savers. For example, in Oklahoma County,
the cost per day to incarcerate a mentally ill offender is $175, while the community
mental health treatment required for an MHC participant is only $20 per day. Jeff
Packham, Advocates Sing Praises of Oklahoma’s Mental Health Courts, J. REC. (Oklahoma
City, Okla.), Oct. 5, 2005. Similar results exist in Ada County, Idaho, where the cost
per person for the MHC is approximately one-third of the cost of housing a defendant in the penitentiary or county jail. McLaughlin, supra note 147.
262
See supra notes 147–69 and accompanying text.
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263

beds. Public funds allocated today by state and federal legislators to
fund permanent MHCs “will be repaid many times over through
lower public costs” via “reductions in expensive long term health
care, diminished need for welfare benefits, and less costly judicial
processes,” as well as increases in “educational achievement, employment opportunities, improved development of communities and
264
the enhancement of family life.”
Thus, while in the short term,
permanent MHCs may require significant funding, their long-term
benefits will more than cover the initial sticker-shock.
C. Personnel
In addition to cultivating community support and ensuring continued financial viability, MHC planners must ensure a constant
source of personnel, most importantly judges. Advocates must adopt
strategies and replenishment mechanisms to ensure long-term staffing, which are most critical when looking at the bench. MHCs confront a quandary in depending upon a particular judge (usually the
judge who spearheaded the court’s founding). Thus, upon the
judge’s retirement, death, or term expiration, MHCs face succession
265
problems.
MHCs present a unique judicial appointment problem, as judges
are disinclined to preside over these new problem-solving courts. For
many judges, problem-solving court assignments are undesirable, in266
jected with high risks and low benefits.
From a professional perspective, current and prospective judges view problem-solving court
appointments as less prestigious, with fewer career advancement op267
portunities. From an institutional perspective, judges are reluctant
to embrace MHCs’ deviations from the precedential orientation of
268
traditional jurisprudence.
263

See Patrick Geary, Note, Juvenile Mental Health Courts and Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Facing the Challenges Posed by Youth with Mental Disabilities in the Juvenile Justice System, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 671, 705 (2005) (discussing the cost-saving
nature of juvenile MHCs).
264
Gail B. Nayowith, A Window of Opportunity for Children Who Stay Too Long, in
CHILDREN'S LAW INSTITUTE 2000, 383 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Series, Criminal
Law & Urban Problems Course Handbook Series No. C-185, 2000) (discussing costbenefits in juvenile context); see also Geary, supra note 263, at 705 (discussing costsaving nature of juvenile MHCs).
265
Rottman, supra note 95, at 24.
266
Cf. BERMAN & FEINBLATT, JUDGES, supra note 88, at 9 (referencing the negatives
associated with a specialized domestic violence court).
267
Rottman & Casey, supra note 125, at 16.
268
BERMAN & FEINBLATT, JUDGES, supra note 88, at 9–10. MHCs are novel and
comparatively unknown when juxtaposed with the precedent and traditions of tradi-
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These drawbacks, however, are surmountable, as MHC planners,
advocates, and administrators have ample carrots to dangle before
judges to encourage MHC participation. The most attractive enticement is the overwhelming professional satisfaction that problemsolving judges experience, as opposed to their traditional court
269
peers.
Such satisfaction was evidenced in MHCs’ older brother,
drug courts. For example, Judge Truman Morrison discussed a senior, stereotypical “traditional judge” who confided that the “single
most meaningful experience” in over two decades on the bench was
270
twelve months serving on a drug court. But the anecdotal proof extends from the courtroom to the family room. A recent study by
Deborah Chase and Peggy Fulton Hora, The Implications of Therapeutic
271
Jurisprudence for Judicial Satisfaction, “stemmed from two judges . . .
who discovered their own alcoholism” after drug court appointment,
as well as the author’s increased happiness due to her assignment to a
272
problem-solving court.
In addition to finding increased professional pride and a “brighter outlook,” the study found drug court
judges and officials stopped smoking, drinking alcohol, realized their
273
own addictions, lost weight, and exercised more.
Chase and Fulton Hora’s study presents compelling statistical
evidence corroborating the anecdote of increased judicial satisfaction
for problem-solving jurists. First, drug court officials have significantly more appreciation for the court’s role than their traditional
counterparts, as drug court officers were more likely to sense that the
court aided litigants and made “significant improvements in [liti-

tional jurisprudence. Id. Thus, the informal, future-oriented, and innovative MHC
structure appears foreign to judges trained as neutral arbiters focused on procedures
and penalties. Id. According to some, such as the District of Columbia Superior
Court’s Judge Tony Morrison III, the round peg of social change may not be a good
institutional fit in the square hole of American jurisprudence. Id.; see also Munetz &
Teller, supra note 40, at 949 (discussing the Akron Municipal Court’s three-year history and noting that the first MHC team was “uncomfortable with non-traditional
methods of case management”).
269
Cf. Deborah J. Chase & Peggy Fulton Hora, The Implications of Therapeutic Jurisprudence for Judicial Satisfaction, 37 CT. REV. 12 (Spring 2000) (informally surveying
194 judicial officers and 123 non-judicial officers from both drug treatment courts
and family law courts).
270
BERMAN & FEINBLATT, JUDGES, supra note 88, at 23.
271
Chase & Fulton Hora, supra note 269, at 12.
272
Id. at 13. (“Personal observation makes it clear that the drug treatment court
not only can have a therapeutic effect on the recovering participant but also on the
other criminal justice players in the courtroom as well.”).
273
Id.
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274

gants’] lives.” Similar results were evident in officials’ attitudes towards litigants, as drug court officials felt respected by court partici275
pants, while also witnessing increased gratefulness among liti276
gants.
These positive effects altered personal lives, as more drug
court officials enjoyed discussing their work, were professionally satisfied, and were less likely to desire transfers than their family court
277
colleagues. Ultimately, 91% of drug court respondents felt their as278
signment “affected them in a positive way emotionally.” In conclusion, the study found that “the enthusiasm of drug treatment court
professionals for their work is not only infectious but is almost unheard of in a profession which experiences a high degree of ‘burn279
out’ and job dissatisfaction.”
However, planners and advocates cannot rely solely on the intangible benefits of problem-solving justice to recruit competent jurists. Tangible incentives must exist. Therefore, MHC judges should
be eligible for salary increases, future promotions, travel opportuni280
ties, and prime office space. Tangible enticements can counteract
the potential pitfalls of judicial assignments to novel courts. Further,
MHC advocates should encourage and create avenues for public rec281
ognition of MHC judges.
Such public acknowledgment will serve
both as an enticement to jurists to participate in MHCs and as a tool
to increase community awareness.
While a pipeline supplying judges to MHCs is important, so is a
pipeline for all players on the MHC stage, no matter how small the
274

Id. at 15. In all, 92% of drug treatment court judicial officers saw improvement
in the defendants appearing before them. Id.; see also Jennifer Batchelor, Mental
Health Court Offers Alternative to Criminal Defendants, DEL. L. WEEKLY, Dec. 15, 2004, at
D1.
“I have been very impressed by the positive feedback that I have gotten
from participants,” [Judge Joseph F.] Flickering [III] said. According
to the judge, numerous offenders have said that the Mental Health
Court made a “dramatic difference” in their lives. “There is a noticeable difference even to a layperson as to their outlook on life, their attitude, their self-confidence [and] their increased ability to . . . deal with
their issues on a daily basis. It's significant.”
Id.
275
Chase & Fulton Hora, supra note 269, at 16. Of the participants in the drug
treatment group, 92% reported feeling respected by litigants, compared to only 72%
of the family law court group. Id.
276
Id. The drug treatment group perceived litigants as grateful 81% of the time,
compared to 33% of the time reported by the family law court group. Id.
277
Id. at 16–17.
278
Id. at 17.
279
Id. at 18.
280
BERMAN, supra note 119, at 4–5.
281
Id.; see also Rottman & Casey, supra note 125, at 17.
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part. As such, all court officials and law enforcement personnel
should be provided with appropriate training to ensure continued
282
Training is critical, as it will accustom stakestaff replenishment.
holders with MHC practices, promote MHC goals, and ensure succession in various MHC positions. Currently, however, training is inade283
quate.
“[T]he problem is that there isn’t enough education or
training of the lawyers who are working in these courts about how to
284
do it a little bit differently . . . .” But, inept training extends beyond
legal education, as, for example, law enforcement personnel in 84%
of the nation’s jails have less than three hours training on mental ill285
ness. Therefore, advocates must increase stakeholder training.
Numerous strategies exist for increased training. The simplest
strategy is to provide stakeholders with educational programs, symposiums, lectures, and other similar events to increase MHC stakeholder
286
interaction and disseminate information. Second, at the state level,
clearinghouse creation will facilitate the transfer of practical knowl287
Third, law enforcement entities can adopt intervention
edge.
288
strategies. The most well known example is the Crisis Intervention
289
The program provides forty hours
Team of Memphis, Tennessee.
of voluntary training in psychiatric and substance use disorders to po290
291
lice officers. Fourth, the cost-saving use of legal interns will pro282

See, e.g., BERMAN, supra note 119, at 4; Kondo, supra note 47, at 284–85 (calling
for judicial expertise); Winick, supra note 32, at 1066, 1069 (calling for judicial expertise); Winick, supra note 115, at 127 (calling for increased training of police officers). Judges should also be included in training programs because, as Dee Kifowit,
director of the Texas Council on Offenders with Mental Impairments suggests, “A lot
of judges have no clue about mental illness.” Andrew Tilghman, A More Sensitive System: Justice for the Mentally Ill; County Judges Consider a Court Where Offenders with Medical
Conditions Get Specialized Treatment, HOUSTON CHRON., February 8, 2005, at B1.
283
Wolff, supra note 65, at 144 (noting that most jail staffs receive less than three
hours of training on issues concerning mental illness).
284
Feinblatt & Denckla, supra note 92, at 212 (quoting Judge Harris Kluger, Administrative Judge, New York City Criminal Court).
285
Kondo, supra note 47, at 309.
286
See Rottman & Casey, supra note 125, at 17.
287
Id.
288
See Lamberti, supra note 43, at 33.
289
Id. Other similar programs include the Psychiatric Emergency Response Team
in San Diego, California, and the Community Service Officer Unit in Birmingham,
Alabama. Id.
290
Id. The voluntary program includes the study of crisis de-escalation techniques. Id.
291
See Baker & Zawid, supra note 232, at 730–34. The University of Miami is currently exploring a therapeutic court externship in conjunction with the Broward
County MHC. Id.; see also, e.g., N.J. CT. R. 1:21-3(b) (providing for the appearance of
third year law students and graduates of American Bar Association-approved schools
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292

vide training and cultivate future stakeholders. By encouraging in293
ternship opportunities, symbiotic relationships can be formed,
where students gain experiential education and MHCs receive inexpensive labor.
D. Infrastructure
In addition to creating an infrastructure providing for the indefinite replenishment of MHC personnel, planners must increase
MHC research. Reliable data can be compiled by creating information management systems (IMS) which will provide invaluable statistics and permit MHCs to improve their practice through heightened
294
accountability and transparency.
Current MHC research has been highly criticized, as advocates
and critics recognize the overall lack of empirical and credible evi295
dence supporting MHCs. One vocal critic stated: “[T]here is no reliable data, in my view, that [problem-solving courts] accomplish any296
Such
thing other than making judges feel warm and fuzzy . . . .”
criticisms have sparked an equally loud clamor for increased re297
search. However, the financial support for such empirical research
before a trial court or agency in accordance with programs approved by the New Jersey Supreme Court).
292
See supra notes 215–16 and accompanying text.
293
See supra notes 195–98 and accompanying text.
294
See Shoaf, supra note 31, at 975. While IMS is a recommended mechanism for
compiling information, MHC planners should be willing to think creatively and utilize numerous forms of research. Id. For example, the Ohio Office of Criminal Justice Services funded a project to address the court’s impact on recidivism and other
criminal justice measures. Id. These moneys led to a case study of the Akron Mental
Health Court, authored by Lisa Shoaf. Id. Such studies, regardless of scale, can provide MHC planners and advocates valuable information regarding the experiences of
other MHCs and provide strategies to avoid past mistakes. Id.
295
See, e.g., Winick, supra note 32, at 1062. “These programs appear to be successful, although the empirical research on their efficacy remains preliminary and often
methodologically flawed.” STEVEN BELENKO, NAT’L CTR. ON ADDICTION AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE AT COLUMBIA UNIV., RESEARCH ON DRUG COURTS: A CRITICAL REVIEW 2001
UPDATE 26–33 (2001); Greg Berman & Anne Gulick, Just the (Unwieldy, Hard to Gather
But Nonetheless Essential) Facts, Ma’am: What We Know and Don’t Now About ProblemSolving Courts, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1027, 1036 (2003); Keele, supra note 36, at 199
(“To date, there has been very little empirical data collected regarding the effectiveness of the current mental health court system.”).
296
The Evolution of Problem Solving, supra note 185, at 1795 (quoting Morris Hoffman). This position, however, is extreme, as numerous studies have recognized the
success of the founding problem-solving courts (i.e., drug courts) in reducing recidivism. See, e.g., Berman & Gulick, supra note 295, at 1030–35 (citing BELENKO, supra
note 295, at 26–33) (acknowledging that drug courts result in higher retention rates,
improve outcomes, and reduce recidivism).
297
See Carns et al., supra note 114, at 54.
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lags. The Marion County, Indiana, Psychiatric Assertive Identification Referral/Response Program is a fitting example as, despite a
long history, the program has no statistics on recidivism due to insuf299
ficient funds.
At the core of MHCs is a reliance on information to recognize
problems, improve operations, increase accountability, and verify
300
outcomes. Thus, MHCs need information to survive, but “[i]t takes
time and money to track recidivism over the long term, to meaningfully weigh program costs and benefits, and to compare new practices
301
to one another, as well as business as usual.” Therefore, rather than
relying on research to be conducted and funded after MHC establishment, such research should be integrated into the court’s infra302
structure. The mechanism: Information Management Systems.
Louisiana drug courts have already adopted and implemented
303
IMS statewide, and a similar program could significantly assist
MHCs. IMS permits advocates to collect reliable, standardized data
304
about outcomes, allowing policymakers to prove the government’s
fiscal responsibility by collecting and reporting information to the
305
public. The results of this extensive research will inform taxpayers,
stakeholders, and policymakers, attracting MHC community support
and positive media coverage and strengthening the persuasive efforts
306
of MHC advocates. Additionally, information permits court officials
to recognize areas needing improvement within their own procedures, while standardized statistics across jurisdictional boundaries
will encourage MHC officials to implement successful practices from
other jurisdictions practices.
However, information accumulation is not enough. Information
must be shared among the numerous individuals and agencies in298

Berman & Gulick, supra note 295, at 1029 (citing LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN ET AL.,
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, PREVENTING CRIME: WHAT WORKS, WHAT DOESN’T,
WHAT’S PROMISING 1 (Lawrence W. Sherman et al. eds., 1998), available at http://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/171676.pdf.
299
Leonard Post, Courts Mix Justice with Social Work; “Problem Solving” Programs
Flourish, NAT’L L. J., June 7, 2004, at 1.
300
BERMAN, supra note 119, at 4.
301
Berman & Gulick, supra note 295, at 1029.
302
BERMAN, supra note 119, at 4; cf. FOX & WOLF, supra note 99, at 36 (examining
IMS in the drug court context).
303
FOX & WOLF, supra note 99, at 36.
304
See Kondo, supra note 47, at 285. Objective factors capable of measurement for
MHCs include the court’s docket clearing efficiency and the percentage of offenders
selecting MHC participation over other tribunals. Id.
305
FOX & WOLF, supra note 99, at 36–37.
306
See id. at 9.
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volved in a MHC to create a successful collaboration. In its formative days, the Akron Mental Health Court experienced difficulties as
information was not being shared among the treatment and criminal
308
justice systems, frustrating all stakeholders.
To correct the prob309
lem, the MHC created a database to incorporate the disparate, and
often duplicative, information, allowing stakeholders to access accurate and updated information concerning participants and their
310
MHC interactions. The creation of a similar system, combined with
IMS, will increase operating efficiency, while staving off future problems associated with MHC establishment.
IV. CONCLUSION
The pilot model of MHC establishment has failed. Until planners recognize and accept this failure, newly created MHCs such as
those in California, Florida, Nevada, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah, and Washington will continue experiencing detrimental
and existence-threatening growing pains.
Since 1997, MHCs have proven their desirability, adaptability,
feasibility, and viability. The influx of mentally-ill offenders into the
criminal justice system created a dynamic necessitating new solutions.
The plight created by the “revolving door” of criminal justice combined with increased judicial dissatisfaction produced an environment where MHCs can thrive. This environment, combined with the
flexible notions of problem-solving justice and MHCs’ initial success
in reducing recidivism, allowed MHCs to populate jurisdictions nationwide.
Despite the positives, planners continue utilizing the pilot model
of MHC creation, refusing to recognize MHC viability. Planners
should abandon the pilot model and instead implement strategies
that will provide for MHCs’ continued success. First, to secure future
success, community support is essential. Communication of a nuanced message through varied mediums will convince citizens, community groups, and policymakers of the importance and benefits of
MHCs. Second, numerous innovative and creative funding strategies
must be implemented to ensure adequate funding. Third, employ307

Shoaf, supra note 31, at 993.
Id. at 988. This lack of communication created a clash in regard to participant
privacy rights and confidentiality. Id. The courts were frustrated by an inability to
obtain information on a participant’s history and treatment from mental health
treatment providers. Id.
309
The database was known as a management information system. Id. at 989.
310
Id.
308
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ment incentives and adequate training are necessary to maintain and
replenish personnel for uninterrupted MHC operation. Finally,
MHCs must adopt IMS to compute and coordinate data and research.
Such information will improve the MHC operation and produce concrete data to be exploited in garnering media attention, securing
funding, and encouraging stakeholder participation.
By adopting and implementing these four strategies, advocates
and planners will ensure MHCs’ continued success. More importantly, such strategies will ensure the community’s safety and the
criminal justice system’s efficacy, while helping those with mental illness conquer their diseases and contribute positively to society.

